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Abstract 
In this research, we discussed the types of evil: moral and natural, which are cited 
by atheistic philosophers as evidence against the existence of God. The so-called 
evidence from evil has been used by the atheistic and other non-theistic scholars to raise 
hypothesis on evaluating the possibility or likelihood that an omnipotent, omniscient, and 
wholly good God exists in a world that is littered with evil. Moral evil is evil that arise 
from the misuse of free will by moral agents, while natural evils are natural disasters such 
as: earthquakes, famine, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes etc. We discussed moral evil and 
Plantinga’s free will defense. We also discussed the natural evil and how it poses threat to 
theism. The logical and the evidential arguments from evil are the forms of arguments 
developed from moral and natural evils. While many scholars have agreed that 
Plantinga’s free will defense adequately responds to the problem of logical evil, the same 
consensus does not necessarily apply to the evidential argument from evil. We also 
examined William Rowe’s evidential argument which he developed from cases of intense 
animal and human sufferings considered by him to be pointless or gratuitous with no 
known reasons or goods for which God should have allowed the visceral experience of 
such sufferings. The work of Rowe and other non-theistic philosophers have made 
evidential evil a relevant and predominantly modern argument, addressing real life cases 
of animal and human sufferings, thereby making a case for atheism and also creating an 
awareness for not just the irrationality of theism but also the problem of the probity, 
morality, or rightness of doing theodicy. We also considered the works of other atheistic, 
and even some theistic scholars, who argue against the morality and rightness of doing 
theodicy. Some of these scholars consider theodicy to be a failed enterprise simply 
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because, according to them, it ignores or suppresses the effects of horrendous and terrible 
evils that human beings and animals experience. Many theistic scholars on the other hand 
reject the notion that theodicy ignores suffering by developing various positively moral 
reasons to support not just the plausibility of theism but also to demonstrate that 
theodicies have successfully provided answers to problem of evil. The thesis of this 
research examines various problems associated with evils and the effects of Rowe’s 
instances of intense suffering on the enterprise of theodicy. It challenges the act of 
theodicy and questions its morality on the basis of its purposes, goals, attitudes, 
problems, truth, and accomplishment. This research concludes that theodicy is not a 
failed enterprise, but it is the only rational explanation to the problem of evil and the only 
option that gives hope and comfort with respect to the effects of various intense and 
horrendous evil in our world. 
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 CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction: Background to the Study  
The problem of evil, pain and suffering, preserves the ancient question of why 
God could have allowed evil in our world. There have been several arguments from both 
theistic and atheistic scholars on the causes of evil in relation to God and how animals 
and human beings suffer as a result of these evils. While they both seem to have good 
reason to make sound arguments, the problem of pain and suffering apparently continues 
to be an important issue in the field of philosophy and theology.  
It is important for theistic, and especially Christian scholars to actively participate 
in this ongoing discussion on the problem of evil because evil seems to be a major 
motivation for anti-theistic worldviews such as atheism, skepticism, agnosticism, and 
other postmodernism worldviews. People’s inability to get answers to their experiences 
raise more doubt, skepticism, and unbelief in a postmodern world. Where is God when 
evil happens, is the question everyone asks. An attempt to answer this question over the 
years brought about the concept to theodicy which is all about presenting a justification 
for the actions of God in the world of evil. Literally, theodicy is a narration or a defense 
that seeks to explain the reasons why God permits evil in the universe. As John Milton 
puts it, “theodicy is the attempt to justify the ways of God to men.”1 
The meaning of theodicy leads to the question of what it attempts to achieve. Nick 
Trakakis suggests that the aim of theodicy is to “vindicate the justice of or goodness of 
God in the face of evil and suffering found in the world.”2 He further explains that this 
                                                           
1 Nick Trakakis, "Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?" Sophia 
47, no. 2 (07, 2008):162 and Milton (1667/2000), Book I, v.26. 
2 Trakakis, "Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, Or Part of the Problem?" 162. 
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vindication depends on the plausibility of the explanation given to why God would 
permit evil in the first place. 
William Rowe, an atheistic philosopher, in his evidential argument from evil, 
argues that there cannot be an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, and loving God with 
the amount, types, and kinds of evil that exist in the world. He argues that: 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.  
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.3 
In his argument, he focuses on instances of “intense human and animal suffering” 
which is in abundance in the world and also occurs on a daily basis.4 Rowe wonders, if 
the omnipotent God exists, then he should be able to stop the intense suffering that 
humans and animals experience. According to Feinberg, Rowe’s concern is about the 
quantity of evil, the intensity of evil and animal suffering in the universe.5 
                                                           
3 William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” In Adams, Marilyn 
McCord, and Robert Merrihew Adams, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 126-
127. Also see, William Rowe, “An Exchange on the Problem of Evil” in God and the Problem of Evil, 
edited by William Rowe (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001): 130, and Rowe, William. “The Problem of Evil 
and Some Varieties of Atheism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1979): 335-340.  
4 Ibid. 
5 John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil (Ill: 
Wheaton, Crossway Books, 2004), 217. 
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Rowe has been vehemently criticized by various theistic scholars, but the impact 
of evil to human existence cannot be overemphasized. Most of Rowe’s critics do not 
seem to address the question of the probity, morality, or rightness of doing theodicy. 
While theodicies attempt to give an explanation for the mystery of disastrous events that 
question the existence of a loving God, they also open another area of intellectuality, and 
religious confusion of the rightness and wrongness of giving any form of defense for the 
occurrences of evil. 
Given that theism is true, the concept of God is of a morally perfect being. The 
understanding of this moral perfection could be in the light of his goodness, holiness, and 
love for his creatures. From an atheistic perspective, the all-powerful God should have 
created a world that will have a minimum amount of evil as compared to what exists in 
the world. Rowe as an atheist asks why there is such an amount of suffering in the world 
created by God. He emphasizes that some of these sufferings may be pointless or 
gratuitous.6  
John Hick explains that some evils are for the purpose of experiencing spiritual 
development but the fact is that a lot of people (children, adults, and even animals) have 
died mysteriously without even having the opportunity of having any spiritual 
transformation.7 Wykstra also explains that the good for which God is allowing some 
intense suffering to take place is beyond our knowledge. Although this good may be 
beyond human knowledge, the suffering is not beyond human knowledge.  
                                                           
6 Nick Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe's Evidential Argument from 
Evil (Netherlands: Springer Netherlands, 2007), 38. 
7 John Hick, “Soul Making and Suffering,” In Adams, Marilyn McCord, and Robert Merrihew 
Adams, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 126-127. 
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Is the good that is beyond human knowledge justifiable given that the amount of 
suffering seems to be overwhelmingly out of proportion? If this good is truly beyond 
human knowledge, then what is its importance to those who suffer and do not even 
benefit from this good? The intense pain that human beings suffer is obvious, observable, 
and experiential, while the good can best be viewed as a product of skepticism. So, is it a 
moral enterprise, especially on the part of theist critics that critique Rowe? Although they 
do not know the reasons why God could have allowed evil, but yet they still propound 
theodicies that will justify the act of God. Rowe asks if an omnipotent God has to allow 
human beings and animals to experience such an amount of evil for greater good. He 
appears to insist that his answer is no. While his argument is not immune to revision, it 
appears that theistic scholars also have more explanations to make especially with regard 
to the morality of doing theodicy. 
Rowe does not seem to question the merits of doing theodicy but to question the 
existence of an omnipotent God. There are enough arguments to prove that God exists, so 
that will not be the focus of this work, but the focus of this work will take a step further 
beyond the problem of evil discussed by Rowe. This is because this work will be an 
enquiry into the probity of doing theodicy with the presupposition that God exists. The 
work will mainly look into the problem of theodicy from the perspective of the 
importance of justifying the allowance of evil in the face of intense suffering. 
Statement of the Purpose 
The central aim of this thesis is to make an inquiry into the probity, merit, or 
morality of doing theodicy. In other words, it is to ask the question of whether it is right 
to justify the fact that people and animals are experiencing pain and suffering. Could it be 
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that theistic philosophers conceive the occurrences of evil as possibly an act of goodness 
from God?  
The word theodicy was coined by Leibniz. Before Leibniz, philosophers like 
Irenaeus and Augustine had made remarkable contributions responding to the natural and 
moral evils respectively. More recently, Alvin Plantinga rejuvenated the free will defense 
as a response to the problem of evil. He believes that the problem of evil constitutes a 
challenge to theism. Obviously, the amount and types of evil around us make some 
people think that the existence of God is unreasonable, irrational, and even unacceptable.8 
There are also philosophers that have attempted to contribute to the discussion on 
problems of evil like John Hick, Richard Swinburne, John Feinberg, Stephen Wykstra, 
and Alston to mention a few. Despite their contributions, there is need for more 
deliberation on the discussion. There is need for more discussion because evil is part of 
existence and we deal with it on a daily basis. Also, this could be the only way to provide 
answers to various questions that are being asked as a result of evil, pain, and suffering. 
Human beings and animals feel pain and experience suffering regularly. Atheistic and 
other non-theistic philosophers have raised relevant questions while some have also used 
this problem of theodicy to question the reason why a good God will permit evil. This 
research work will not mainly address the various types of evil, it will consider the 
concerns and questions asked by critical scholars on the morality of doing theodicy. 
Constructing theodicies could be a path to resolving a lot of problems that evil has 
raised; however, it could also be part of the problem. Trakakis, a theistic philosopher, 
comments about theodicy as an enterprise that attempts to justify God’s permission of 
evil by searching for some greater good. In his analysis, he believes that the enterprise of 
                                                           
8 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 9-12. 
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doing theodicy has failed systemically.9 The major challenge that theodicists face is the 
problem of providing morally sufficient reasons that God “might have for creating a 
world littered with evil.”10 Theodicy becomes a problem when morality is lacking in 
relation to the suffering and pains that evil brings to human beings.  
Some anti-theodical views posit that given what theism stands for, it is expected 
that it rejects its commitment to justifying God’s permission of evil. Some have also 
asked some meta-theodical questions on the legality of theodicy as a response to the 
problem of pains and suffering. Theists could have reasons to be tolerant or persevere in 
times of evil based on their worldview, but it would be unfair to force this thinking on 
those that are not theists or who want to make theodicy a generic answer to the problem 
of evil. 
It appears that theodicy is most often built around not just greater good but 
epistemic distance and eschatology without which the concept of theodicy will collapse. 
Theodicy may appear to be ineffective when considering some specific cases. Feinberg 
explains that most theodicies follow more or less the same strategy. They begin by first 
attempting to adopt a notion that omnipotence God can do only what is logically 
possible.11 Secondly, they argue that for God to create the actual world, he had to choose 
between two good options. Where one is that, he either creates a world with moral evil 
along with morally free agents or creates a world without evil and also create agents that 
are not morally free. For example, Plantinga in his free will defense, argues that for God 
to actualize this actual world, he has to create a world where agents are 
                                                           
9 Trakakis, "Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, Or Part of the Problem?" 160. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 489.  
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incompatibilistically free. For Hick, the second option was for God to create a world with 
evil that can build the souls of humans. For instance, in his Soul Making theodicy, there 
is a notion that there is need for spiritual growth and other forms of development. 
Therefore, evil and other forms of human experience is mainly for the purpose of 
knowing God better and also becoming better humans with the ultimate benefit of having 
a communion with God in the afterlife. Finally, most of these theodicies present evil as a 
necessary condition for good. This last strategy seems to be common to most of the 
Christian theodicies along with the benefit of the afterlife. But how about those that die 
young, or, according to Trakakis, find themselves in regress due to “terrible adverse 
circumstance” in which they find themselves that could not even allow them to 
experience any form of development, as in the case of the soul making theodicy? The 
difficult questions for all theodicies is that: must evil be a necessary condition for God to 
achieve some greater good or for him to actualize this actual world? 
One of the theistic arguments for why evil exists in this actual world is that, man 
as a moral agent misuses his free will there by resulting into moral evil. If man is to be 
blamed for moral evil, who is to be blamed for natural evil? Unlike moral evil, man does 
not seem to have any involvement in the cause of natural evil because it is believed that 
natural evil happens as a result of the circumstances at which the universe itself is 
sustained (although some theistic scholars believe that man could still be the cause of 
natural evil either remotely or proximately). If God created the universe, then he must 
have created these circumstances and therefore could be connected to the causes of 
natural evil. In other words, God sustains the universe. Since man does not seem to have 
been responsible for the cause of natural evil, why would God permit such types, kinds 
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and amounts of evil that both man and animal suffer from? And since suffering is now 
part of human life, is it even more justifiable to do theodicy or is it justifiable to justify 
any reason for which man should suffer? Could justifying the reason why God permits 
evil also be part of the evil? 
Finally, this work will look into the significance of doing theodicy, especially to 
the sufferer. Theodicy gives hope to both theists and the sufferers. Although there are a 
lot of questions to ask when it comes to theodicy, theism and the problem of evil, the fact 
remains that theodicy could be doing more good than otherwise. 
Statement of Importance of the Problem 
The question of morality of doing theodicy creates the platform to assess the 
purpose, importance, and value of theodicy. Since theodicy is meant to solve part of the 
problem of evil, a probity of this enterprise will address the possibility of this activity 
becoming a moral problem. 
Statement of Position on the Problem 
1. Evil exists. 
2. There are morally justified reasons why God permits evil (Theodicy). 
3. Therefore, God is morally justified for permitting evil, (Theodicy is 
moral). 
The idea of making an enquiry into the probity of theodicy will want to question 
the three parties involved; a) God b) Theodicists, and c) Critics. For God to be morally 
justified, the theodicists have to give some reasons why God could permit evil. If God 
shares the same moral community with humans, then, there must be a greater good that 
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can overwhelm the amount of intense suffering that human’s experience. And this good 
must be such that it is greater than the evil and suffering human beings experience.  
The position of this research is that God is morally perfect and not guilty of 
permitting evil in this world. From the dilemma of God either removing evil or 
permitting free will, it seems that creating free agents is a morally perfect decision. 
Moreover, it will be logically contradictory and morally against God’s nature to remove 
evil and permit free will at the same time and in the same sense. For human beings to be 
morally free agents seems to be a type of good that overrides the effect of evil. Also, it 
will be immoral to hold man morally responsible for his actions if he is not morally free. 
Furthermore, this work will argue against Rowe’s claim that some evils could be 
considered pointless. From the literal meaning of pointless, Rowe’s instances of pointless 
evil are not necessarily pointless. For Rowe to be able to use those instances of evil as 
objects of argument means that the events are neither pointless nor gratuitous. We might 
be ignorant of God-purpose goods for which he permits evil, however, we do not have 
enough reasons to deny them. 
It is the theodicist’s responsibility to give a defense for theism. While Rowe could 
have argued that a world without evil could have been a good world, a theodicist would 
argue that a world with free will is a better world. And if God exists, then it is within the 
theodicist’s epistemic right to make an argument for theism on the basis of having a 
limited scope of knowledge to comprehend all the good reasons for which God could 
have allowed evil. In other words, if God is infinite, then there is no ways human being’s 
finite mind can know all the ways of God.  
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It is expected of a sufferer to find it very difficult to grasp the concept of theodicy 
in the midst of pain and suffering, but the truth of every narration of theodicy could really 
be of help at this time. If God exists then it is not unreasonable to think of the possibility 
of having an eternal intimacy with God at the after-life. Secondly, the misuse of free will 
also contributes to the amount of evil that there are. The sufferer should be educated on 
not just the cause of types of evils but all the probable causes and reasons for which God 
could have allowed evil. 
Finally, theodicy should be continually criticized by both theistic and atheistic 
scholars.  A critical approach from a theistic scholar is appropriate because he believes in 
the existence of God. A criticism of this nature is not an anti-theodical view, but from a 
perspective of empathy. For theists who have an expanded view of God, the purpose of 
making such as inquiry or having a critical approach to theodicy may be to show concern 
about the amount of pain and suffering humans pass through. Evil is intrinsic into human 
nature and a critical approach from a theist will not just want to justify, but will also want 
to distance himself from the notion of taking pleasure in justifying human suffering and 
pain, hence the need for inquiry into the probity of this activity of justification. 
Limitation 
Rowe’s argument is to promote atheism and also to question the existence of God. 
Although this work raises concern on the reality of intense suffering, it will not promote 
the course of atheism like Rowe. It will be limited to literally using a prima facie 
interpretation of Rowe’s argument about intense suffering to ask relevant questions about 
the rightness and wrongness of doing theodicy. 
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The concept of morality to be used in this work will be based only on the general 
principles of ethics that evaluates or distinguishes between the rightness and wrongness 
of an action or event. There will be no detailed discussion on the theories or types of 
ethics. Any question on whether an act or event is moral, will literally want to determine 
the extent to which that action or event is right or wrong in relation to the values of the 
person or views being discussed. 
Definition of Terms 
Four words will be defined from the title of this work. They are; evil, theodicy, 
pointless, and probity. 
Saint Augustine was the first to define evil as the privation of good. This simply 
means that evil cannot exit on its own but rather feeds on good that already exists. In 
other related definitions, evil has been defined as the “antithesis of good with the 
intentional effect of precipitating destruction and harm, and is perceived to be morally 
objectionable, distasteful and/or malefic.”12  
Theodicy can be defined as the righteous act of God among men.13 The word 
theodicy was first coined by Leibniz. In Leibniz’s explanation, God necessarily exists 
despite the existence of evil in this world. His act is righteous even with the existence of 
evil. 
                                                           
12 Michael Obanla, “The Problem of Evil, Modern Calvinism and the Doctrine of Free Will: Is 
John Feinberg’s Theodicy a Coherent Resolution to the Problem of Tragic Evil?” Master’s thesis (Liberty 
University, 2012): 9. 
 
13 Trakakis, "Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?" 162. 
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Probity is synonymous to morality, but it literarily means a “quality of having 
moral principles.”14 It can also be associated with integrity. The quest to investigate the 
probity of theodicy also means to investigate into the morality or rightness or wrongness 
of doing theodicy.  
Pointless according to Merriam Webster Dictionary, is something that have “no 
meaning, purpose or effect.”15  Pointless or gratuitous evil is a description of intense evil 
that William Rowe introduces in his evidential argument from evil. From this definition, 
there is probably no evil that could be pointless since it will definitely have an effect, 
either positively or negatively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
14 Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, “probity” accessed March 24, 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/evil. 
15 Merriam-Webster Dictionaries, “pointless” accessed March 24, 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pointless. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Critical Appraisals of Problem of Evil and Problem that Emerges from Doing 
Theodicy 
The existence of evil in the universe poses some epistemic questions to all beings. 
Although it is not convenient to give a generally acceptable definition for evil, it seems to 
represent any form of negativity or anything that inhibits pleasure while at the same time 
causing pains. The questions that are being asked end up evaluating the reasonableness 
and rationality of believing in God. God remains the most important subject matter of the 
problem of evil. Why is there evil in the world created by a good God? Can the existence 
of evil make theism irrational?     
From the perspectives of atheism, God does not exist and all their contributions to 
the problem of evil is to prove that their position on the existence of God is true. This 
atheistic position also questions the character of God. In simple terms, if God exists then 
it should be impossible for evil to exist. But since evil exists then God does not exist.  
A theist position would be a direct opposite of an atheist. Theistic philosophers 
argue or make their cases on the problem of evil by establishing their points on the fact 
that this is a theistic universe. Whenever there is a discussion on any issue concerning 
evil, the theists have always taken the position of defending God by attempting to 
reconcile their beliefs with the reality of the human experience. Chin Tai explains that the 
reason while theistic philosophers will always take a defensive position is simply because 
of the God they believe in. A defensive position requires them to have the ability to 
reconcile the goodness, love, and power of this Omnipotent God with the reality of evil 
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which also brings about defects to the universe.16 He questions if the theistic worldview 
was constructed with the consciousness of the evidence of various experiences that 
emerge from evil and if it does, then why does it still find it so difficult to resolve the 
knot of contradiction between their belief in God and various occurrences of evil?17  
Although the existence of evil is not enough to prove theism to be irrational, it is 
interesting to know that this problem has brought about proliferations of varieties of 
theism. Before considering William Rowe’s varieties of theism, some medieval 
philosophers have their conception of the ultimate reality. For Plato, his demiurge is 
omniscient, free good, but not omnipotent in the light of Christian theism. Matter and 
forms are completely separate from Plato’s God and they rather respond to natural and 
mechanical necessity which places limit on God’s omnipotent. Aristotle has a different 
conception of God although his own God does not seem to be omnipotent either. He 
explains that God is completely separate from the cosmic universe and God’s main 
responsibility is to cause motion, whereas, he himself is not moved.18 Rowe explains that 
one could be a theist either in the narrow sense or in the broad sense.19 In his varieties of 
theism and atheism he explains that someone who is a narrow minded theist believes in 
the all-powerful, all-knowing and the all-loving God. The broad minded theist simply 
have a conception of a divine reality.20  
                                                           
16 Kim Chin-Tai, “Problem of Evil in Theistic and Non-Theistic Framework: Ways of Sense 
Making,” International Journal of the Humanities 8, no.9 (December 2010): 169-172. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 126. 
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The relevance of these varieties of theism is to help understand various theodicies 
and various theodical responses to the problem of evil. Like other theories, this responses 
are to be evaluated against data in concurrence with reasonableness, rationality, 
consistency, accuracy, actuality, explanatory power, and both theoretical and practical 
applications. Every theodicy seeks to solve the problem of evil by explaining the place of 
human beings and the role of God in the epistemic structure of existence.  
 Problem of Evil, Types of Evil, and Varieties of Theodical Responses  
Evil and suffering is not a recent discovery in philosophy but what makes it to 
continually get attention is the un-deniability of its experiential evidence. Arguments 
have changed and positions have been adjusted on this issue, but the problem and 
consequential experiences from it, remain constant with no hope of ending soon. As this 
evil continues to occur, human beings continue to respond to it.  
In an attempt to understand the problem of evil by definition or distinction, there 
are some potential challenges to understand. Problem of evil is not homogeneous in 
nature and according to Feinberg, “there is no such thing as the problem of evil,” simply 
because it is multidimensional.21 As Feinberg has explained it, there are a lot of issues, 
questions and problems that could be discussed in relation to God and evil. Feinberg 
prefers to make two distinctions of problem of evil out of which the various types will be 
analyzed. His two distinctions are religious problem of evil and philosophical/theological 
problem of evil.22 The religious problem of evil arises when a person experiences a 
particular or an instance of evil which results in the sufferer wondering why God did not 
                                                           
21 John Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil 
(Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2004), 21. 
22 Ibid. 
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prevent the suffering. The theological/philosophical problem of evil has to do with the 
existence of evil in general which results in the difficulty of reconciling the possibility of 
these types of evil co-existing with God. Feinberg summarizes this 
theological/philosophical problem of evil into the other varieties of evil which are moral, 
logical, natural, evidential, and the problem of hell.23  
It will be necessary to admit that there could be more problems in attempting to 
identify all the varieties of evil that various scholars have opinionated, but for the purpose 
of this work, we shall focus on moral and natural evils as the types of evil. Moral evil is 
the type of evil whose negative impact can be traced to a human agent. This type of evil 
arises from human actions. It is believed that these types of evil are the ones that occur as 
a result of human beings misusing their freewill. Natural evils on the other hand might 
not be as a result of human activities at least to a very large extent. Examples of natural 
evils are: earthquakes floods, hurricanes, famines, pestilences, and other naturally 
induced pain and sufferings.24 There are arguments that have been developed from the 
evidences of evils that exists. Some of these arguments will also be examined. 
Moral Evil and the Free will Defense 
Of all of the most commonly talked about evils, moral evil seems to be the most 
humanitarian, anthropological, ethical, and theologically challenging. Plantinga describes 
moral evil as the evil that “results from human stupidity, arrogance, and cruelty.”25 
                                                           
23 Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil, 21-22. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 8. 
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Plantinga believes that the existence of moral evil is one of the causes of atheology.26 
Atheological discussion begins with the question of why God permits evil. If God exists, 
then he is all-powerful, benevolent, loving and caring. Atheists and those who probably 
have doubts about the existence of God expect that God should have been able to either 
create a world without evil or stop evil from existing at all. It appears that the emphasis 
sometimes is been taken away from the free human agent who inflicts the world with 
moral evil. But much emphasis seems to be directed towards the problem that arises from 
the evil which is reconciling the existence of God with evil.   
Why is there Evil? 
Hume, Mackie and other atheists have used the moral evil to raise the argument 
from evil. They argue that 
1. God is God because he is believed to be omniscient, omnipresent, and 
omnibenevolent.  
2. If God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, then the world will 
not contain moral evil that exist. 
3. Moral evil exists in the world. 
4. Therefore, God does not exist. 
                                                           
26 Plantinga describes the cause of moral evil as one of the reasons why people have atheological 
discussion. Atheological discussions probably means a theology against the existence of God, see Alvin 
Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 8. 
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Hume, in his Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion, insists that “if God is 
perfectly benevolent and omnipotent, or almighty, why is there any evil in the world? 
Why does he permit it?”27  
He writes: 
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not 
willing? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing then he is malevolent. Is 
he both able and willing? Whence then is evil? …..Why is there any misery at all 
in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause, then. It is from the 
intension of the deity? But he is perfectly, benevolent. Is it contrary to his 
intension? But he is almighty. Nothing can share the solidity of this reasoning, so 
short, so clear, so decisive, except we assert that these subjects exceed all human 
capacity…… if we preserve human analogy, we must forever find it impossible to 
reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less can 
we ever prove the latter from the former.28    
 
Hume seems to be very concerned with what he perceives to be contradiction in the 
infinite attributes of God and the reality of evil that humans experience. Any reply to this 
problem will be able to give a rational reason why God could have permitted evil in the 
universe. In other words a response to the problem of evil brought about theodicy.29                                                                             
 Theodicy is more than a response to an extent, it could also be perceived to be 
not just an argument but a responsibility or religious obligation.30 Christian apologetics 
                                                           
27 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: The Posthumous Essays of the 
Immortality of the Soul and of Suicide (Parts X) 2nd edition, ed. by Richard Pokin (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 1998), 63. 
28 Hume, Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion, 66-67. 
29 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 10. 
30 Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers 
Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2011). Giving defense for one’s faith is a biblical requirement and 
responsibility. Christian religion has always faced different type of extender and internal aggression since 
its existence. There were different types of heretic teachings and doctrines that rose against the church but 
the church has always survived all these aggressions. Apostle Peter encourages believers to be prepared to 
give a defense for their faith at any time. This admonition is as important the gospel itself. It is as important 
as the gospel because the gospel might have cease to exist if not for those who defended it since first 
century. The work of early church fathers and scholars have helped to prevent the gospel as this act of 
providing defense for one’s faith ought to continue among Christians. 
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make effort to defend the Christian faith even in the face of evil. This is because they 
believe that it is their responsibility to make this defense even when they do not seem to 
understand the reason why God could have permitted some evils.  
For instance, William King, an eighteen century Christian apologist and scholar, 
although admits that there is evil in this world, he also argues that there is abundance of 
good than evil.31 Kraal Andre objects to King’s claim and believes that this argument is 
unconvincing, however, King’s claim seems to have some amounts of correspondence to 
reality because the amount of evil in the world has not caused the world to cease to exist. 
Despite the evil in this world, human beings naturally have the instinct to survive. 
Some philosophers prefer to always blame God for the evil that exists in the world 
without giving attention to the abundance of good that also exists or even blame human 
                                                           
31Andre Kraal, "A Humean Objection to Plantinga's Quantitative Free Will Defense," 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73, no. 3 (June 1, 2013): 221-233, and William King, An 
Essay on the origin of Evil (1732). King was a prominent Anglican Scholar of the eighteen century. He 
believes that the amount of good in this world is more abundant that the amount of evil. He writes, “it is 
manifest, that though Good be mixed with Evil in this life, yet there is much more good than evil in nature 
…..” Kraal Anders in his own objection to the work of Alvin Plantinga on moral evil, claims that king’s 
argument is unconvincing. King intends to make his own argument from a scientific point of view. For 
him, despite the amount of evil, every animal has the instinct of good that is sufficient to keep them alive. 
King further argues, “Every animal provides for its preservation by instinct or reason, which it would never 
do, if it did not think or feel its life, with all the evils annexed, to be much more preferable to Non-
existence. This is a proof of the wisdom, goodness, and power of God, who could thus temper a world 
infested with so many Miseries, that nothing should continue in it which was not in some measure pleased 
with its existence, and which would not endeavor by all possible means to preserve it” (King, An Essay on 
the origin of Evil 1732, 78). Kraal finds King’s argument to be logically invalid. This is because even if 
sentient creatures seems to experience more good, it is not enough reason to admit that there is more good 
that evil in this world. He also argues that an animal’s instinct to survive could have any motivation and 
that preference for life does not necessarily means that they prefer life over non-existence. This instinct he 
claims could be non-derivative and basic. Finally, he argues that preference for life could basically be as a 
result of fear of the unknown or an unintentional hope of a better life. Kraal calls King’s argument, an 
Abounding Goodness Assumption, and it is not a valid argument against evil. I have some objections here 
against Kraal. Firstly, his objection King’s claim of natural instinct to survive does not seem to be forceful 
enough. This is because, biologists have explained that any living organism (Plant or animal), have to a 
natural instinct to survive. Secondly, if the amount of evil in this world is not proportionate or above the 
amount of evil, it is possible that this world could have been destroyed or even cease to exist with an 
abundance of evil. Although there is evil, there is no enough reason to think that the amount of good is 
lesser than the amount of good. Finally, according to Augustine, evil is a privation of good. In other words, 
evil does not exists on its own but rather feeds on the good that is available. Therefore any existence of evil 
is an evidence that good, indeed exists. 
 20 
 
being’s misuse of their free will. Others even believe that it is inconsistent for both God 
and evil to exist. Like Hume, J.L. Mackie argues that the theistic claim that God exists in 
this world is inconsistent given the amount of evil that exists, and also positively 
irrational.32 He writes: 
……Not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively 
irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are 
inconsistent with one another….. In its simplest form the problem is this: God is 
omnipotent; God is wholly good; yet evil exists. There seems to be some 
contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were 
true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of 
most theological positions; the theologian, it seems at once must adhere and 
cannot consistently adhere to all three.33 
 
Mackie’s argument for evil is what is referred to as the logical problem of evil. His 
position is that if evil exists at all, then it is impossible for God to exist. Plantinga’s work 
has been considered to have resolved this problem.  
The logical problem of evil poses the question that: “is the existence of some or 
all of evil in this world logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God?”34 The 
components of this question are: 
1. God exists. 
2. Evil Exists. 
Given that evil and God exist, what does it mean for two propositions to be 
logically inconsistent? According to Plantinga, sets of propositions are said to be 
inconsistent35 only if: 
                                                           
32 John Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell 
(London: Oxford University Pres, 1971), 92, and Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 12. 
33 John Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell 
(London: Oxford University Pres, 1971) P.92, and Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 12. 
34 Dr. Martin. “Problem of Evil,” (Personal Communication from Class), spring 2015. 
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a) They are either explicitly inconsistent or implicitly inconsistent. 
b) Two statements are explicitly inconsistent if one statement is the negation 
of the other.  
For instance: i) James’ phone is blue. ii) James’ Phone does not have color. This two 
propositions are inconsistent because if something is blue, then it necessarily has color. It 
can be logically deduced that these two propositions are inconsistent. Two propositions 
are inconsistent once they can be joined with a third statement that is necessarily true to 
make it logically deducible that the first two statements are explicitly inconsistent. 
From the conditions given above for which two propositions can be inconsistent, 
it is probable that Mackie’s position that the existence of both God and Evil are 
inconsistent could be false. Firstly, from b, one can argue that 2 is not the negation of 1. 
Unlike the example given above in i and ii, 2 is not a negation of 1, i.e., evil exists is not 
a negation of God exists.36  
Plantinga argues that Mackie’s logical problem of evil fails. Mackie’s position is 
that if any evil exists at all then God does not exist but Plantinga objects that Mackie’s 
claim is false. According to Plantinga, there is no inconsistence in the possibility that 
Omnipotent, all-powerful, and wholly good God could permit evil in the world he has 
created. He explains that God has moral reasons for allowing or causing any evil in this 
world.37 With this submission, Plantinga was able to argue that it is not improbable that 
God exists given that evil co-exists with Him. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 12-13. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 12-13. 
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Plantinga’s Free Will Defense 
It appears that Plantinga’s view of moral evil is that it is necessary for God to 
permit evil in order to bring about some kind of good. For that reason he considers it 
consistent for evil to exist in this world. Some of this type of good is man’s freedom. In 
his free will defense, he argues that there is a state of affairs that is good but this state of 
affairs cannot be achieved unless God permits some evils.38 This state of affairs that is 
good entails that man must be free to use his will freely.  
Plantinga begins his free will defense by stating his perception of freedom. His 
perception of freedom is from an indeterminist position. He writes, “If a person is free 
with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain 
from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/ or causal laws determine that he will 
perform the action, or that he won’t. It is within his power, at the time in question, to take 
or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it.”39 
Plantinga suggests that a world that contains free creatures is better than a world 
that contains creatures that do not have free will. God’s creatures are free but he cannot 
cause or compel them to do only what is right. He believes that if God compels them to 
act in a certain way, then they are not free at all. God created human beings with the 
ability to be morally good. Although God is omnipotent, it is not within God’s power to 
create a world that will contain moral good without moral evil. Plantinga concludes that, 
                                                           
38 Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 92-93, and Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 29. 
39 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 12-13. 
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if human beings are significantly free as defined, then which world becomes actual is 
partly up to the free will agents and not up to God.40 
It does not seem literally consistent that God is all-powerful and omnipotent, yet 
having somethings that he cannot do. Some philosophers have rejected the fact that 
although God is omnipotent, there are somethings that he cannot do. They suggest that if 
God is truly all-powerful then he should be able to do anything. Does omnipotence means 
God’s ability to do anything even if it is immoral? A theistic response to this is that God 
can do all that is able to be done. C.S. Lewis and other theistic scholars argue that God’s 
omnipotence does not negate rationality. Mackie among others rejects this submission. 
Natural Evil and Unattached Natural Evil 
There are different definitions of natural evil but the simplest clarification is that, 
it is any type of evil that does not involve human activity. Natural evil is sometimes 
called non-moral evil because it cannot be traced to any moral agent.41 It remains a major 
challenge to theism and especially Christian theism that holds that, God is 
omnibenevolent and all-powerful. From Plantinga’s free will defense, it is understandable 
that God cannot be blamed for moral evil but natural evil seems to be different because 
by its nature, it seems to be avoidable. The critical question to ask is what could be the 
possible causes of natural evil? What is responsible for the causes of these types and 
kinds of evil? Does this evil have any good? What is the role of God in natural evil? 
These are some of the questions that many believe not to have been justifiably answered.  
                                                           
40 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 12-13.  
41 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 198. 
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One major important thing to note is that natural evil is a product of natural laws. 
In simple terms, the same laws that preserves the world, seems to be the causes of these 
natural events. In other words, for natural evils to stop, the natural laws that govern the 
world have to cease to exist. Logically, it is impossible for the laws of nature to cease to 
exist because these are the same laws by which the universe is sustained. If it not possible 
for these laws to cease to exist, then it is logically impossible for natural evil to stop.  
Feinberg explains that, although there are lots of unattached natural evils, God is 
not to be held responsible for these evils neither is he obligated to eliminate this category 
of evil from the world.42 He attributes natural evil to be the result of a fallen world and 
that God has been gracious to have preserved this world.43 Although he believes that 
natural evil is as a result of fallen world, he still believes that some categories of this evil 
are not product of human activities but events that naturally occur given the way the 
universe is designed. He writes: 
[Unattached natural evil] are evils that are attributable to processes in the natural 
order outside of human beings. The earth and its atmosphere are made in such a 
way that any of the natural evils in this category can occur. For example since 
there is rain in our world, there can be too much rain (floods result and crop 
failures can stem from those floods) or too little rain (drought results, and from 
drought there may come crop failures which cause famine). Since the earth’s crust 
can move, it can move enough to cause an earthquake of any magnitude. God can 
get rid of these problems by ridding our world of these natural processes, but why 
would he want that? We do need rain, sunshine, and the like to survive in our 
world. Most of the time when there is rain, wind, sunshine, etc., it isn’t harmful. 
Moreover, not even every earthquake or flood is harmful to us or to other life 
forms. So why should we expect God to remove these processes altogether? We 
need them to sustain life as we know it, and there is no guarantee that life as we 
know it could survive with different natural processes.44 
                                                           
42 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 13 and Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 198.  
43 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 196. Feinberg’s reference to fallen world in this instance is to the 
Genesis record of how man fell in the garden of even. For Feinberg, the fallen world is as a result of sin. 
44 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 197. 
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Feinberg’s position on natural evil is similar to that of Reichenbach. They both argue 
from a perspective that does not attribute the evil to either God or human beings. They 
conceive of it to be part of why the universe exist altogether. Just as Yancey explains that 
a minimum amount of pain is needed in the human body for anyone to be alive or 
survive,45 similarly, there has to be an amount of natural evil for this universe to exist.46 
Reichenbach argues that for God to remove natural evil he will have to remove 
natural laws and if he removes natural laws, then the world will be completely different 
from what it is. He seems to suggest that not just the evil will be eliminated but the good 
that is in it will cease to exist. The creatures that are existing will have to cease to exist 
and God will have to create another form of creatures. He argues that requesting for such 
a natural processes is not a solution to the problem of natural evil. In his book, “Evil and 
a Good God,” he writes: 
The introduction of different natural laws affecting natural beings order to prevent 
the frequent instances of natural evil would entail the alteration of human beings 
themselves. Human beings are sentient creatures of nature. As psychological 
beings they interact with nature; they cause natural events and in turn are affected 
by natural events. Hence, insofar as humans are natural, sentient beings 
constructed of the same substance as nature and interacting with it, they will be 
affected in any natural system by lawful natural events. These events sometimes 
will be affected in any natural system by lawful natural events. These events 
sometimes will be propitious and sometimes not. And insofar as man is 
essentially a conscious being, he will be aware of those events which are not 
propitious and which for him constitute evils. Therefore to prevent natural evil 
                                                           
45 Philip Yancey, Where is God When it Hurts? (MI: Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1997), 29-35. 
46 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 196-8. He believes that natural evil is a necessary event. He uses 
an example of bacteria to illustrate that although bacteria causes diseases in the body, however, an amount 
of bacteria as micro-organism is still needed to keep any human being alive. He explains that bacteria help 
to break down injected food and also help in other area of digestion (198). He writes, “For us to expect God 
to remove these micro-organism, then, seems somewhat unreasonable, especially since we don’t know how 
the positive functions they serve would be accomplished in a different world.” He believes that this world 
has fallen because of sin. Sin then makes this world to be what it is. Then for human beings to survive, the 
world has to be the way it is and that God is not obligated to remove this evil.  
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from affecting man, man himself would have to be significantly changed, such 
that he would be no longer a sentient creature of nature.47 
 
Reichenbach and Feinberg hold a similar position on why natural evil cannot 
cease to exist. Feinberg then concludes that since it is unreasonable to ask God to remove 
the good that the natural order brings, then it is also unreasonable to ask God to remove 
the evil that the natural order brings.48 In other words, natural evil also brings natural 
good. This sounds like another version of the greater good defense and it does not seem 
to answer the problem of why God who is omnipotent and all-powerful would not create 
a world that is free of evil. 
Feinberg’s response seems to be an argument of faith or rather a theological 
response. This is because he started his argument on the theological basis of a fallen 
world and that the world is the way it is because of sin. His argument does not seem to 
address the problem of natural evil as being unattached to an agent. If natural evil is as a 
result of the fallen world or sin, then it is not correct to define unattached natural evil as a 
type of evil that does not involve human activity. Since it is man that committed sin and 
not animals or other creatures like plants, trees and rocks, then evil can be traced to 
human activity which is sin, either directly or remotely. He seems to be correct that 
                                                           
47 Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God, 75-76, cited in Feinberg 198-9. 
48 Feinberg summarizes his argument on the reason why evil exists and why he thinks that God is 
not obligated to remove it be using F. R. Tennant’s suggestion that natural evil also brings natural good. 
Tennant explains that water has a lot of good components that serves the universe good. From rain to 
drinking water, to sewage, factory water and other good things that water brings to this world. It is also true 
that the same water causes humans to drown. Can we then ask God to remove water from the earth just 
because there are instances of water causing drowning? This sounds reasonable but it does not seem to 
solve the problem of evil. Tennant writes: “to illustrate what is here meant: if water is to have the various 
properties in virtue of which it plays beneficial part in the economy of the physical world and the life of 
mankind, it cannot at the same time lack obnoxious capacity to drown us. The specific gravity of water is as 
much as necessary outcome of its ultimate constitution as its freezing to any substance an arbitrarily 
selected group of qualities from which all that ever may prove unfortunate to any sentient organism can be 
eliminated especially if ….the world…is to be calculable cosmos.”  (F.R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology 
II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1928), cited in Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God, 75-76. 
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natural evil is not as a result of human sin but his theological explanation for the problem 
of evil seems to be lacking, because it does not explain why God could have created a 
world in which he permits natural evil.  
Evidential Argument from Evil and Theism 
William Rowe has made very tremendous contributions to the argument on evil 
from evidence. In this chapter, Rowe’s evidential argument from evil will be briefly 
mentioned since it will be the main focus of the next chapter. However, various 
contributions from other scholars on this topic will be given adequate attention. 
God remains the subject matter of all discussion in the problem of evil. The 
understanding of the character of God especially from a monotheistic perspective or 
western philosophy will be highlighted. The conception of God from this perspective is 
from the orthodox theistic conception, which Rowe calls the broad sense of theism. God 
in the broad sense is conceived as omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, wholly good, and all 
powerful. The problem of evidential evil arises from Rowe’s inductive argument on the 
logical incompatibility between the omnipotent all powerful, wholly good God, with the 
amount, kind, type and particular evil that exist in this world. Rowe’s aim was to make an 
argument for atheism. The evidential argument of evil seems to pose more problem for 
theism than the logical problem of evil, and it is clearly different from it.  
Plantinga on Evidential Evil 
Plantinga believes that it is properly basic for theists to believe in God despite the 
challenge that the problem of evil poses and that it is within their epistemic right to do 
so.49 Evidential argument from evil being an inductive argument, to some extent, relies 
                                                           
49 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford, 1974), 193-194.  
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on probability. The main questions are: Does the amount, type, kinds, and distribution of 
evil in this world make God’s existence improbable? Does the totality of these evils make 
it improbable or reduces the probability that God exists? Plantinga’s response to these 
questions is negative.  
Plantinga believes that his freewill defense can be used to respond to the problem 
of evidential evil. He explains that his defense against moral evil can go for evidential 
evil since all evils can still be traced to one agent or the other.50 He argues that it is not 
within God’s power to create a word with much moral good without moral evil, and that 
the amount and distribution of evil is not also enough to confirm that God does not exist. 
Since evil cannot even be measured or ascertained, the probability that God exists or not 
cannot be determined by the amount of evil that exists in this world.  
Plantinga believes that all types of evil in this world are either as a result of some 
creature’s activities or they are just as a result of the way Kronos, that is, the actual 
possible world works.51 Despite the existence of this evil, an atheist does not even seem 
to have a better argument to use against the existence of God. This is because the 
majority of the evil that exist is moral evil, and perhaps, not just from human creatures 
alone, even from non-human agents.52 In his conclusion, he submits that “the free will 
defense however, shows that the existence of God is compatible, both logically and 
probabilistically, with the existence of evil; it solves the main philosophical problem of 
evil.”53 
                                                           
50 Plantinga, God, Evil, and Freedom, 62-64. 
51 Ibid., 64. 
52 Plantinga, “The Probabilistic Argument from Evil” Philosophical Studies 35, no. 1 (1979): 2-3. 
53 Plantinga, God, Evil, and Freedom, 64. 
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Rowe’s evidential argument from evil is an inductive argument that is based on 
probability. Plantinga describes Rowe’s argument as an argument that does not give the 
atheist a strong argument against theism, and it is not also sufficient enough to affect the 
faith of a theist.54 He maintains that the existence of evil cannot disconfirm the existence 
of God and that evidential evil does not make God’s non-existence to be more probable 
than His existence. If the logical problem of evil could solve the problem of moral evil, 
then it should also raise the probability that God exists and that theism is more probable 
than atheism.  
Plantinga’s response to the evidential argument attracts a lot of criticism. Chrzan 
criticizes Plantinga’s argument describing it as a flawed argument. Chrzan writes:55 
Even if Plantinga could show that God’s non-existence isn’t more likely than 
God’s existence, given evil’s existence, he still wouldn’t have shown that evil 
doesn’t disconfirm God’s existence. That is, given evil’s existence, God’s 
existence might be less than .5 probable, even if his nonexistence is even less 
probable than his existence. So long as God’s existence is less than .5, evil 
apparently disconfirms God’s existence…56 
 
Bruce Langtry does not accept Plantinga’s argument but also sees Chrzan’s criticism as 
weak. Langtry submits that although the amount of evil can raise questions of doubt 
about the existence of God, it is not clear how it can tell or affect the probability of God’s 
existence. He concludes that the totality of all the evils we know, does not make it 
improbable that God exists.57 Finally, a critical appraisal of Plantinga’s argument should 
                                                           
54Alvin Plantinga, “Degenerate Evidence and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” Nous 
32:4 (1998) 531.  
55 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 283. 
56 Plantinga, “Degenerate Evidence and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” 531-535. 
57 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 283. 
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demonstrate that although the free will defense seems to be effective against moral evil, it 
does not seem to be sufficient enough to respond to all natural evils or the evidential evil. 
Evidential Evil and the Scope of Human Knowledge 
Theistic philosophers have made a lot of effort to respond to atheistic 
philosopher’s denial of God. But given the complexity and diversity of nature in relation 
to God, it is probable that the elusiveness of God could be as a result of the limitation of 
the scope of human knowledge. Human beings are bound by space and time. The greatest 
limitation to human existence is the reality of the limit of human knowledge. The 
epistemic question is, how much do human beings know about the universe and the ways 
of God?  
Atheistic philosophers have asked the question of why an all-powerful and wholly 
good God should create a world littered with evil. It is critical to admit that the scope of 
our knowledge of the universe is limited. 
Could the question of scope of human knowledge lead to skepticism? Apart from 
the possibility that human knowledge is limited, most religions still hold to the claim that 
no one can really know the purpose for which God could have done whatever he did. The 
fact that we cannot know all the reasons behind God’s actions is not to be taken as a form 
of philosophical response but rather as a true response that corresponds to reality. 
Gratuitous Evil 
Gratuitous evil is also known as pointless evil. It plays a big role in determining 
the rationality of theism, especially in an atheological evaluation. Some theistic scholars 
such as William Hasker and Daniel Howard-Synder among others, refute the notion that 
gratuitous evil is pointless or purposeless. Hasker even describes what Rowe calls 
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pointless evil to be a necessary evil that is required for the sustenance of the universe. It 
is contradictory for gratuitous evil to be both pointless and necessary at the same time. 
Hasker strongly argues that gratuitous evil is a necessary evil that if God 
eliminates, He could as well undermine what should have been the standard of morality.58 
In his response to Alan Rhoda, in his article “Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence,” 
Hasker agrees with Rhoda on his analysis of the gratuitous evil, but opines that his 
formulation of the theological basis as a response to this evil is weak.59 They both agree 
on the importance of redefining gratuitous evil. Firstly, Rhoda, suggests that using the 
word ‘permit’ may not be appropriate and that he would rather use the word ‘ordained.’60 
In his words, Rhoda explains that the word ordained means that God could have either 
weakly or strongly actualized an event.61 The difference between the two words is that 
one (strongly) gives sufficient condition for the event to happen, while the second 
(weakly) “actualizes conditions knowing for certain that they will lead to the event.”62 
Rhoda’s clarification between these words opens up the argument in such a way that 
elucidates the general meaning of evil hereby making it more realistic and human, than 
the way the atheist normally present the act of God in the midst of evil. It is probable that 
redefining these words could further illuminate the meaning of gratuitous evil.  
                                                           
58 William Hasker, "Defining 'Gratuitous Evil': A Response to Alan R. Rhoda," Religious Studies 
46, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 303-309. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Alan R. Rhoda, “Gratuitous, Evil and Divine Providence,” Religious Studies 46, no. 3 
(September 1, 2010): 281.  
61 Rhoda, “Gratuitous, Evil and Divine Providence,” 281-292. 
62 Rhoda, “Gratuitous, Evil and Divine Providence,” 281-292. 
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In Rowe’s definition, he defined gratuitous evil as “an instance of intense 
suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby 
losing some greater or permitting evil equally bad or worse.”63 In Rowe’s analysis of 
evidential evil, he uses some special instances of cases that appeal to emotions. Rhoda 
suggests that this method might not be the best for this work. He argues that in defining 
gratuitous evil, a general sense of evil should be used. His own definition of evil in the 
general sense is that “evil is an event-token which is such that, in relation to the good it is 
objectively better that it not occur, than it occur.”64 Before making his argument for 
theism, Rhoda simplifies the complexity of problem through definition.  
Using Rhoda’s refinement, Hasker revises Rowe’s definition. Firstly, Hasker 
explains that omniscient means that God could have had an antecedent knowledge of the 
event. Secondly, he could have prevented the event. Thirdly, preventing the event could 
have made the world better. In the light of this, God had an antecedent knowledge of 
instance of some intense evil that he could have prevented to make the world a better 
place. But the purpose of Rowe’s definition was to argue that, God does not exist given 
the instances of intense suffering that he could have prevented, if he exists. Hasker argues 
that contrary to Rowe’s argument, gratuitous evil only exists if God exists because there 
would not be a God to prevent an evil he knew of if he does not exist in the first place. He 
opines that the core of the evidential argument is in its definition. He modifies Rowe’s 
definitions and writes: “a gratuitous evil by definition is a token or type of evil which 
God, if God exists, could antecedently know He could prevent, in a way that would make 
                                                           
63 William Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" in The Evidential 
Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 335, and also see 
Rowe, “Problem of Evil,” edited by Adams and Adams, 130. 
64 Rhoda, “Gratuitous, Evil and Divine Providence,” 302. 
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the world overall better.”65 He revises the definition and decides to negate the possibility 
of tokens or instances of  negating the existence of God.66 If God exists, then there occurs 
no tokens or types of evil which God, if God exists, could know He could prevent in a 
way that would make the world overall better.67 
He then concludes that: 
[Hasker] …. Contends that the theological premise undermines moral motivation 
and so should be rejected by theists. Thus, if God prevents all gratuitous evil, then 
every evil that occurs is either necessary for a greater good or such that the world 
would be overall worse unless something comparably bad occurs in its stead. But 
if so, then all successful efforts to prevent evil are counterbalanced by additional 
evils (or loss of goods) elsewhere. Hence, we can’t do anything to make the world 
overall better. If we believe this, contends Hasker, it will undermine our moral 
motivation. So if God wants us to take the demands of morality seriously…. God 
must permit gratuitous evils.68 
 
As earlier stated, Hasker’s position on gratuitous evil is that it is a necessary evil 
and not pointless if morality is not to be undermined. Rhoda clearly does not agree with 
his conclusions. Rhoda prefers to differentiate evils that could be prevented by God from 
evils that could have been prevented by moral agents. Apart from the division on evils 
that could be prevented, there are evils whose harm could outrageously be more than 
their good, and this requires more moderation on Hasker’s position. 
What makes the difference between the two arguments of both theists and atheists 
in this context will be the purpose of the evil. The basic elements of the argument is that 
there is evil that is perceived to be preventable. God is the only perfect being that could 
have prevented this evil. Instead of preventing it, he allowed it. Why could he have 
                                                           
65 Rhoda, “Gratuitous, Evil and Divine Providence” 305. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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allowed it? Hasker suggests that the reason why God could have allowed it was to uphold 
morality. Others like Swinburne say it is for the purpose of knowledge. Atheists on the 
other hand argue that if God is omnipotent, all-powerful and also exists as the theist 
claims, then he should have prevented it and since he has not prevented it, then he does 
not exist. Is the atheistic argument from evil in view here sound? It is rational to think 
that the fact that God did not prevent evil does not imply that he does not exist. From all 
the various reasons that have been offered by the theistic philosophers, there are a lot of 
reasons for which God could have not prevented instances of this evil, which could be on 
the basis of morality, knowledge, or a purpose that is probably not known to humans. 
Feinberg explains that some of the solutions that theists have suggested could 
want to allow atheists to raise concern that theism is compatible with gratuitous evil. He 
agrees with other scholars that redefining gratuitous evil is the first step to resolving it. 
Some theistic scholars even argue that Rowe’s definition is fallacious and that there is a 
better way to define gratuitous evil such that, it will not count against theism. 69 However, 
theists should be careful about giving the atheist an opportunity to use the notion that 
theism is compatible with gratuitous evil.70  
Theodical Views, Anti-Theodical Views, and the Importance of Theodicies 
 
John Hick’s Soul Making  
 
Borrowing from the traditions of Augustine and Irenaeus, Hick constructs his 
theodicy. In his theodicy, he believes it could be part of God’s plan to bring man from his 
                                                           
69 Feinberg agrees with Jane Trau that it is question begging for an atheist to argue that some 
sufferings have no purpose. Starting an argument on the definition of an evil as being pointless is “a fallacy 
from ignorance, and an error of arguing from an inductive to a universal claim.” Also see Jane Mary Trau, 
“Fallacies in the Argument from Gratuitous Suffering,” New Scholasticism 60 (Autumn 1986): 486. 
70 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 382-383.  
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image to his own likeness.71 Hick analyzes Augustine’s tradition on the cause of evil with 
an attempt to relieve God of being responsible for the cause of evil, but rather blames 
human beings for their misuse of the free will that God had given them. Since God 
cannot give man free will and debar him from using it, He cannot be blamed for the evils 
that come as a result of that. On the other hand, Hick seems to agree more with the 
tradition of Irenaeus where God created man in his image but man will have to pass 
through the imperfections of the world to get to the state of perfection that will eventually 
take man to the likeness of God.72  
Augustine defines evil as a privation of good.73 He believes that God created man 
and the universe as good and man fell into sin, but with the hope of being reconciled with 
God. Hick’s criticism of Augustine is that sin is a moral issue and not a metaphysical 
issue, therefore sin should be viewed in the light of morality.74 Hick believes that God 
created man in the universe that requires man to look unto God for perfection. The state 
of imperfection in the universe is meant to prepare man, which he calls the soul making 
theodicy. 
Hick believes that atheistic argument for evil could be misleading because life 
should not be measured from the amount of pains or pleasure but by its purpose which is 
soul making. Not many philosophers agree with Hick but Robert Brown writes on his 
(Hick) soul making theodicy explaining that the goal of God for allowing evil in the 
                                                           
71 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1996) 337. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 38. 
74 Ibid. 
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world is to develop good character in humans and other meaningful traits that are not in 
human’s natural attributes. Brown further writes: 
……. choosing to face hazards steadfastly is what makes one actually brave rather 
than untested or cowardly. A suitably challenging environment and free will are 
requisite for character development and free will requisite for character 
development to occur. The physical environment must be governed by uniform 
natural laws, though their operations sometimes result in mishap, suffering, even 
death for us or for others….. If I do you deliberate harm, God will not erase the 
injury so that I escape guilt feelings or legal action or the moral disapproval of 
others. Hick held that our actual world is, on average, suitably challenging, but 
overly so, for “soul-making” to occur….. Therefore the natural and moral evil of 
our actual world are no disproof of a good and powerful God.75 
 
Greater Good Defense 
A long time theistic defense is that although there is evil in the world, there are 
probably good reasons for which God could have allowed some particular evils. In other 
words, it is possible that some goods could never have been achievable, if those evils 
were prevented from ever happening. This form of defense could also be referred to as 
the greater good defense. 
Theodical and Anti-Theodical Views 
The main subject of discussion in the problem of evil and theodicy seems to be 
the existence of God and God at the center of various questions being asked, makes 
philosophical enquiry very important. Although atheistic philosophers take for granted 
that God does not exist, their criticism and denial of the existence of God at the same 
time, implies a sharp contradiction in their positions. Without laying emphasis on this 
contradiction, it will be assumed that once an atheist decides to contribute to the 
discussion of the problem of evil, it could be taken for granted that God exists.  
                                                           
75 Robert Brown, “Theodicy,” The Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed by Eerdmans. (Brill. Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, 2008), 355-356. 
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In other words, if God does not exist then the problem of evil does not exist. Similarly, if 
the problem of evil does exist as it is obvious to our everyday living, then God exists.  
In explaining this argument, we will appeal to G.E. Moore shift.76 G. E. Moore shift is an 
indirect procedure that can be used to counter an argument. Using a general example of 
this procedure,  
1. p  II not-r 
q       q 
r      not-p 
 
The first argument there is p, q, therefore, r. We can observe that this argument is a valid 
argument. Instead of arguing against this first argument directly, we can argue indirectly 
against it, and it will result into what we have in (II) above: not-r, q, therefore, not-p: 
which is also a valid argument. It simply begins with the denial of the conclusion of the 
first argument, keeps its second premise, and then denies the first premise of the first 
argument. The denial of the first premise of the first argument, becomes the conclusion of 
the second argument. The law of logic supports that if the first argument (I) is valid, then 
the second argument (II) is valid as well.77  
 We started an argument (before considering the G. E. Moore shift), that the atheist uses 
the problem of evil to argue against the existence of God. The atheist begins by arguing 
that God could have prevented instances of intense suffering. A being that does not exist 
                                                           
            76 Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: an Introduction, 128. The Moore shift is an indirect procedure that 
can be used to counter a valid argument. Rowe explains that “the procedure is called G.E. Moore in honor 
of the twentieth-century philosopher G.E. Moore, who used it to great effect in dealing with the arguments 
of the skeptics Skeptical philosophers such as David…..who have advanced ingenious arguments to prove 
that no one can know the existence of any material object…. Instead of arguing directly against the 
premises of the skeptic’s argument, he simply noted that the premises implied” Moore directly against the 
premise hereby making it possible for him to have a counter conclusion which also makes a valid 
argument. For example, 1. P, Q, therefore R II. not-R, Q, therefore not-P.   
77 Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: an Introduction, 128. 
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cannot be accused of not preventing an event. There is problem of evil because of what 
the atheist perceived to be either God’s action or his nonintervention. If God does not 
exists, then there will be no need for the problem of evil. Although the atheistic scholars 
deny the existence of God in reality, they could have conceived of his existence in 
understanding.78 Applying this to the argument we started above, we can use the problem 
of evil to make an argument for the existence of God and afterwards, apply the Moore’s 
indirect procedure to it:79 
1. God does not exists because the problem of evil exists. 
2. The Problem of evil exists. 
3. God does not exists. 
Our second argument can then be: 
      3.* God exists. 
      2. The Problem of evil exists. 
      1.* God exists because the problem of evil exists. 
 It appears that the first premise of the second argument (3*) is the denial of the 
conclusion of the first argument (3). The second premise remains the same for both 
arguments, while the conclusion of the second argument (1*) is the denial of the first 
premise of the first argument (1). From the example given above: p, q, therefore, r and 
not-r, q, therefore, not-p; our arguments above are valid. 
 
                                                           
78 Anselm argues that to deny the existence of God means that he has been conceived of in the 
understanding. If he exists only in understanding, then he could have also existed in reality. He concludes 
that God could have exist in reality as well as in the understanding. See Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: an 
Introduction, 41-42. 
79 Ibid. 
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Summary 
 In this chapter, we have critically examined the types of evil and the various arguments 
forms of evil. From the discussion so far, we have discovered that it is possible for both 
God and evil to exist. The conclusion that both God and evil can exist, corresponds with 
Plantinga’s free will defense, where he argued for the compatibility of God and evil. We 
have discovered from this chapter that, firstly, if theistic scholars can argue for the 
compatibility of both God and evil – which Plantinga has demonstrated- the logical 
problem of evil will be resolved. Secondly, we can use the G.E. Moore shift to argue for 
the existence of God, even from the fact that the problem of evil exists. However, Rowe 
does not necessarily argue against the compatibility of both God and evil. His evidential 
argument from evil is against the probability of God’s existence, given the amount, types, 
kinds, distribution, and intensity of evil. In the next chapter, we shall consider the three 
stages of Rowe’s argument (early, middle, and latter), some theodical responses to this 
argument, and the problems that emerge, when theistic scholars respond to the problem 
of evil with theodicy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Should the Theist Respond to William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil with 
a Theodicy? 
William Rowe believes that the logical problem of evil failed because Alvin 
Plantinga was able to prove that it is consistent for God and evil to co-exist. Since it is 
neither contradictory nor inconsistent for both God and evil to exist, then the free will 
defense is valid and sound. While Rowe agreed with the success of Plantinga’s argument, 
he presented the evidential argument for evil, where he argue that the types, kinds, 
amounts, and cases of particular evils that exist are worrisome, and might be sufficient 
enough to argue that God does not exist. Before systematically and analytically 
considering Rowe’s argument, it is important to give a brief development of the work of 
Rowe with three major periods: early, middle and latter. 
Rowe’s Argument against Theism 
Early Period of Rowe’s Writings  
The beginning of Rowe’s argument can be traced to his paper on the problem of 
evil he published in 1978 as Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, and this period is 
believed to have lasted till 1986.80 Before this publication, he had made some 
contributions to the problem of evil in general, and then introduced the evidential 
argument, but admits that he does not have enough reason to justify that “cases of severe, 
protracted, and involuntary human pain which are not necessary for any greater good” 
exist, and at the same time, does not think that it is unreasonable for theist to think that 
                                                           
80 Nick Trakakis, God beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from 
Evil, (AA: Dordrecht, Springer) 1997, 48. 
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his proposition is false.81 At this stage, he accepts the evidential evil, but he cannot 
defend it. But in his subsequent publications, he argued that there could exist possible 
worlds where things could have been done differently, in such a way that there would be 
no Hitler, and moral agents could have made better judgements. Based on his speculation 
of this possible world, he suggests that there is a reasonable ground for atheism because 
there could have been a better world that could be apparently different from this actual 
world. His classical analysis of the evidential evil began to take a more sophisticated 
shape from 1979 with series of publications: The Problem of Evil and Varieties of 
Atheism, Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra, and The Empirical 
Argument from Evil. 
In his work: The Problem of Evil and Varieties of Atheism, he writes:82 
1. There are instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
2. An omnipotent, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
3. Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good 
being.  
 
Rowe believes that this argument is valid and therefore there is rational grounds for 
believing atheism. 
 The second premise of this argument is known as the theological premise because 
it addresses what God can either do or not do, and what he could have done should there 
be a case of intense suffering. Calling the intense suffering s1, Rowe writes:  
                                                           
81 Rowe.  Philosophy of Religion, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1986; (a review of Plantinga’s 
work). 
82 Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," 127-128. 
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2’ “either there is some greater good, G, such that G is obtainable by 
OG only if OG permits s1  
2’’ or there is some greater good, G, such that G is obtainable by OG 
only if OG permits either s1 or some evil equally bad or worse. 
2’’’ or s1 is such that it is preventable by God only if OG permits some 
evil equally bad or worse.” 
 
From the given propositions, 2’ states that preventing E1 could amount to losing 
some GG (greater good) while 2’’’ reveals that if E1 is prevented, then there could be 
“equally bad or worse evil.”83 The distinction just made reveals that 2’ is different from 
2’’’ and leads to an assumption that even if a good is lost, it does not necessarily mean 
that a bad state of affairs is available.84 In the same vein, 2’’ is quite different because 
God preventing E1 will lead to some evil. From the following propositions, it seems that 
God could not be blamed for E1. 
Rowe’s position on premise 2 is true, given that God could have prevented E1 
only for the reason that it would either permit greater evil or lose some greater good. He 
suggests that this position of premise 2 is held by atheistic and some theistic 
philosophers. It is possible that some scholars might want to argue that, no amount of 
good could justify the permission of innocent children suffering, and that it is morally 
justifiable that evil is permitted, simply because some greater good outweighs the evil. 
Some critics of Rowe agree that premise 2 is not the main problem of his argument but 
the factual premise, premise 1 seems to be the problem. 
 Most criticisms of Rowe comes from the first premise. This proposition is about 
the possibility of an instance of intense suffering which Rowe calls ‘gratuitous or 
                                                           
83 Trakakis, God beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil, 51. 
84 Ibid. 
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pointless evil.’ Gratuitous evil is a type of evil that Rowe believes that God could have 
prevented without thereby permitting some equally bad or worse evil or losing some 
greater good. Logically speaking, it is gratuitous because it is pointless and no worse evil 
will happen and also, no greater good will be achieved. 
 Critics of Rowe doubt if there is any evil such as gratuitous evil in the first place. 
They believe the key to accepting or rejecting this premise rests on the meaning of 
gratuitous evil and the possibility of its existence. 
Rowe’s hypothetical explanation to support his claim of gratuitous evil:85 
a. Let’s assume that a fawn was caught in a fire and horribly got burnt but suffered 
for several days until its death. 
b. Omnipotent God could have either prevented the fire or even ended the fawn’s 
life, without letting it pass through such horrible suffering. 
c. As far as we know of this tragedy, it is pointless since we could not see any 
greater good that the fawn’s suffering could have brought. 
d. We can then conclude that “there exists at least one instance of intense suffering 
which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby 
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.”86 
e. It is unreasonable to think that all instances of intense human and animal 
sufferings are not pointless.  These instances could have being prevented by an 
omnipotent and wholly good God. 
 
                                                           
85 Rowe, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, 127. 
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Ambiguity to Rowe’s Argument 
From a-c above, Rowe seems to be arguing for the instance of the fawn but his latter 
conclusion seems to be of general claim. His argument is that the instance of a fawn was 
to be an example of types of pointless evils that occur that an omnipotent, omniscient and 
wholly good God could have prevented. Rowe claims that there is an enormous amount 
of evil in our world that provides support for the first premise.87 
Rowe arguing for the quantity of evils could reveal his intention to extend his 
argument from a particular case to a general conclusion. The case of the fawn could have 
given reasons to think that there are several other cases. His claim is that, there are 
instances that intense animal and human sufferings occur around the world in large 
quantity with reference to the case of the fawn. Rowe wants to ground his argument on 
the fact that the case of the fawn makes it probable that there could be several other 
instances of pointless suffering in great number. In other words, since the case of the 
fawn reveals that an intense pointless suffering is possible, it is then possible that there 
are several other pointless sufferings around the world.  
Jane Trau argues that Rowe’s move from one instance of inductive argument to a 
universal claim in his conclusion is a fallacy and an error. Also, she opines that Rowe’s 
use of the word ‘Gratuitous’ is fallacious. She made four submissions: 
a. To argue that an event is genuinely gratuitous is to affirm that there is no 
purpose to it. Rowe would not have used a purposeless event to make an 
argument. Therefore to argue that some evils are purposeless is question 
begging.  
                                                           
87 Michael Bergman, “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” Nous 
35:2 (2001) 278-96, and Jane Mary Trau, “Fallacies in the Argument from Gratuitous Suffering,” 486. 
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b. Rowe’s evidential argument is a fallacy from ignorance. 
c. For Rowe to move from an instance of intense suffering to a general 
conclusion is an “error of arguing from an inductive to a universal claim.”88 
Middle Period of Rowe’s Writings 
Nick Trakakis prefers to give a second division of the development of Rowe’s 
argument from evidential evil to be from 1988-1995.89  He suggests that this period is an 
era that is completely different from the previous work of the early period, but rather a 
continuation, only with a difference that seems to be that Rowe decided to use a “more 
precise and systematic manner than the earlier one.”90 The second era can be traced from 
Rowe’s paper on “Evil and Theodicy” in which he designed another version of the same 
argument by revisiting the factual premise. 
Rowe decides to use a human example in his argument recounting on a real life 
event, where a five year old girl was beaten, raped and then killed by strangling in 
Michigan in 1986, by her mother’s boyfriend.91 Rowe names the fawn ‘Bambi’ (E1) and 
named the five year old girl ‘Sue’ (E2). His goal is to present cases of both natural and 
moral evils, that will be difficult for theistic scholars to defend as not being pointless, for 
which God would have allowed for some greater goods.  
Rowe restates his argument this way: 
 
                                                           
88 Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 379 and Jane Mary Trau, “Fallacies in the Argument from 
Gratuitous Suffering,” 486. 
89 Trakakis, God beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil, 57. 
90 Ibid. 
91 William Rowe, “Evil and Theodicy,” Philosophical Topics 16 no2 (1998): 121. 
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(P) No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient 
being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1 
Therefore, 
(Q) No good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s 
obtaining it would morally justify that being in permitting E1 or E2.92 
 
From the argument above, Rowe inferred P from Q. It is good to know what each of these 
propositions seek to assert. Both propositions begin with a concept of good state of 
affairs that we know. The claims intend to show that no good state of affair that we could 
probably know of in this actual world could have justified an omnipotent God to permit 
E1 and E2. Rowe could probably want to clarify the theistic good of afterlife from the 
good we know of in actuality.  
Consequently, P will be true if there is no good we know of, for which God could 
have permitted E1 or E2. In other words, one condition under which P could be true is, if 
we do not know any such good in the actual world for which God could have permitted 
E1 and E2. Even if the good will be for the afterlife, we do not know if sufferers or 
victims will share in the bliss of the afterlife (since both Sambi and Sue are dead) and this 
could probably make P true.  
Another condition for which P could be true is if God does not exist. 
a. “(P’) No good we know of would justify God (if God exists) in permitting E1 and 
E2.” (If we decide to negate P by way of differentiating it from P’). 
b. “(not-P) there exists a good we know of and that good justifies God in permitting 
E1 and E2, and that God exist.” Making a disjunction from P: 
                                                           
92 William Rowe, "The Evidential Argument from Evil: a Second Look” in The Evidential 
Argument From Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996) and 
Trakakis 52.  
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c. “(P’’) Either God does not exist, or God exists and no known good justifies God 
in permitting E1 and E2” 
d. And this will make Rowe arrive at the same conclusion that, there does not seem 
to exist a good state of affairs that could morally justify an omnipotent God to 
permit E1 and E2. 
What condition could make Q true?  
 
a. Firstly, Q asserts that no good could justify the permission of E1 and E2. 
b. Just like P, an assured condition for Q to be true is if God does not exist. 
c. From b, if God does not exist, then there would not be anyone to accuse of 
permitting E1 and E2. 
d. Similarly, a negation of Q will then lead to the inference that Rowe made from P 
to Q, which then reveals that Q entails P, although Rowe also states his inference 
from P to Q (inductive form) is similar to inferences from known to unknown.93  
e. “(not -Q) God exists and there is a good that justifies God in permitting E1 and 
E2.” (Soon, we shall see that Rowe thinks that negating Q will make a false 
proposition). 
f. Rowe’s argument shows an inference that given P, Q is the case. 
g. In other words, given that P ( no good at all would justify an omnipotent, 
omniscient being in permitting E1 and E2), then Q (No good state of affairs is 
such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify 
that being in permitting E1 or E2) is the case. 
                                                           
93 Trakakis, God beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil, 60-
61. 
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h.  Similar to f above, let’s assume that “we are justified in believing Q on the basis 
of our belief that P.” Since we see from e above that Q would be false if 
omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God exists, “we are (therefore) justified 
in believing that omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God does not exist.”94 
Latter Period of Rowe’s Writings 
 
In this period, Rowe’s work started from 1996 to 2014. Rowe responded to 
William Alston on skeptical theism. Michael Bergman explains that in this latter 
Argument, Rowe intends to present a ‘better’ argument that will provide answers 
against some theses of theistic skepticism,95 and this almost makes Rowe’s argument 
look completely new. He began by stating the main component of the last argument 
P, Q and also introduced G (which is a proposition that God exists), as wells a 
probability [(K1) Pr (G/K)], to establish his claims. He seems to abandon the last two 
arguments where he argued for ‘goods that we know’ and ‘the goods that are.’ And 
by doing that, he bypasses Q to G. 
Restating Rowe’s claim for new and old variables: 
                                                           
94 Rowe, The Evidential Argument from Evil: a Second Look, 61. 
95Bergman in his paper, “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” 
presents an argument to support theistic skepticism. He writes a preamble to Rowe’s new evidential 
argument from evil. Rowe’s work focuses on these theses: “What is skeptical theism? It has two 
components—a skeptical component and a theistic one. The skeptical theist’s theism is just the traditional 
monotheistic view that there exists an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being. It is the skeptical 
theist’s skepticism that (NOÛS 35:2, 278) needs explaining. Rather than attempt a precise definition of her 
skepticism, I’ll simply list here some of the skeptical theses that are plausibly associated with it. We can 
call these ‘the skeptical theist’s skeptical theses’: ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the 
possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. ST2: We have no good 
reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of are representative of the possible evils there are. ST3: 
We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know of between possible goods and 
the permission of possible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are between possible 
goods and the permission of possible evils.” 
 
 49 
 
a. “(P) No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient 
being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1.” 
b. “(Q) No good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s 
obtaining it would morally justify that being in permitting E1 or E2.” 
c. Not -G: There is no omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good and perfect being.  
d. K: represents knowledge of the amount of evil that exists such as E1 and E2, and 
the knowledge of some goods that occur and those that do not occur. It does not 
however include the knowledge or claim of God’s existence or not. 
Using Bayes’ Theorem, Rowe continues his argument giving values to his probabilities.  
The work is meant to provide equal probabilities to both theism and atheism to ensure a 
level ground for both. Let the P (G/k) and P (~G/k) be 0.5. Rowe’s intension is to 
determine if someone who has the knowledge of E1 and E2, after learning about P could 
reach a conclusion like ~G. This could be made possible by also determining if the 
probability of (G/P&k) is less than the probability of (G/k). In an instance where 
Probability of (G/P&k) is less than probability of (G/k), then P could be a reason for ~G 
“since P makes G less likely than it would be otherwise.”96 Bayes’ Theorem becomes one 
means of determining how one probability could be more or less than the other:97 
 
 
From the above, it appears that the probability of (P/G&k) is less than the 
probability of (G/k). If Pr(P/G&k) is less than Pr(G/k), it will then be possible for us to 
                                                          
96 William Rowe, “The Evidential Argument from Evil: a Second Look,” 61, and Michael 
Bergman, “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” 278. 
97 Ibid. 
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think that P could be a reason for ~G. The main difficulty is how to determine that 
Pr(P/G&k) is less than Pr(G/K). To determine that Pr(P/G&k) is less than Pr(G/K), we 
have to note that P is the reason for ~G. If God does not exist, there will be no P, that is, 
there will be no good we know that would justify God for permitting E1 and E2, since He 
does not even exist. Similarly, if ~G entails P then the probability of (P/~G&K) equals 1. 
Stephen Wykstra’s Argument 
Of all the various criticisms of Rowe’s argument, Wykstra’s response seems to be 
among the few that Rowe accepted, although not without a counter argument. Wykstra 
developed the CORNEA (Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access) arguing that we 
might probably not accept what we cannot see. In a better way, CORNEA’s purpose is to 
argue for the seeability of an event. He argues from “we see no ‘X’ to ‘there is no X’ only 
when X has ‘reasonable seeability’- that is, is the sort of thing which, if it exists, we can 
reasonably expect to see in the situation.”98 Wykstra uses an illustration of two living 
things which exist but can be determined by their size and seeability. He argues that if a 
dog is on his garage, he cannot deny not seeing it, but it is very possible for a noseum, 
which is a type of flea, to be in the garage without having any seeability and someone can 
claim not to have seen it. The flea, has a very low seeability, and even if present, it is not 
unexpected to not have seen it.  In a similar way, Wykstra argues that we expect to see 
God’s ‘good’ but given the disparity between God’s vision and ours, he argues that 
cannot be. And for this reason, Rowe’s argument failed the CORNEA seeability test.   
In Rowe’s response, he accepts the CORNEA but he also believes that his 
argument passed it. He posits that there will be no reason to think that God’s good, for no 
reason, should lack the necessary or required seeability. 
                                                           
98 Stephen Wykstra, The Evidential Argument from Evil, 126. 
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In the fawn’s argument, he writes:99 
a. “We see no good for which God would allow E1.” 
b. “There appears to be no good for which God allows E1.” 
c. “Therefore, there is no good for which God allows E1.” 
Rowe uses the principle of credulity to ground his claim on the ‘appear mode.’ 
That is, if something is perceived to be X, one is epistemically justified in believing that 
it is X, until there is a counterexample to prove otherwise.  He uses this claim because, 
one is believing in X only if it is something that one will have epistemic access to. For 
one could be justified in believing that he could not see any God-purposed good for 
which he could have permitted the suffering of the fawn, given his cognitive faculties. If 
there is any good for which God had permitted the suffering, it would most likely not be 
seeable, especially when there is defeater to prevent him from doing so. For this reason, 
he would have to defeat the defeaters. Similarly, if Rowe already had reasons why any 
good reason for God permitting evil will not be seeable, it is not unreasonable for him not 
to see the good, because he would most likely not see it. 
 Wykstra maintains that the disparity between God’s vision and our vision plays a 
big role. This is because, the best analogy for this disparity could be the vision of a 
mother to that of her infant child. There appears to be a big gap between these two 
visions. It is possible that most of our discerning could be likened to that of the infant, 
who is expected to discern the purposes of his parents. This is most unlikely given the 
disparity between both visions. Similarly, God’s purpose for the permitting the fawn’s 
suffering will likely lack seeability by humans. 
                                                           
99 Stephen Wykstra, The Evidential Argument from Evil, 127-8. 
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 Summarily, Rowe insists that it is not possible that all God’s good would not be 
seeable. If CORNEA provides answer for instances of suffering like that of the fawn, 
would the CORNEA then serve all purposes of suffering?  Wykstra suggests that if God 
exists, it takes only the reasonability to know that God-purpose good overwhelms the 
evil, and that these good purposes are beyond our ken. However, the CORNEA seems to 
face more difficulty when subjected to some critical counterexamples. 
Theodical Response to Rowe 
 Rowe’s inductive argument in support of atheism could want to pose a threat to 
theistic belief, but it is just on the surface. Some theistic scholars argue that since the 
argument is based on probability and lacks certainty, the question of whether a theistic 
philosopher should respond with a theodicy becomes relevant. The response begins by 
wanting to redefine what Rowe meant by pointless. His concept of pointless has to be 
defined from a theistic perspective. Secondly, it is necessary to note that arguments on 
probabilities and statistics are based on degrees of possibilities and cannot completely 
remove any chances of having an exempting logical or metaphysical possibilities. 
Furthermore, Rowe’s explanation for background knowledge only favors his argument. 
From a theistic perspective, a background knowledge or information should not just 
comprise of evil and good alone, but it should also include the existence of God. The call 
for this inclusion seems appropriate since it is believed that this good comes from God. 
Therefore, if the good will be given any form of consideration at all, then its source must 
also be included. And lastly, if God exists, then it is not unreasonable to accept the fact 
that there are greater goods that outweigh the cases of suffering for which God could 
have permitted evils in this world. 
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How can evil be quantified? How did Rowe come to the conclusion of giving an 
account of the quantity of evil that there are? Despite the amount of evil, it is still 
probable that there are greater amount of goods that outweigh evil. For two reasons: 
firstly, evil is a mere privation of good and it cannot exist on its own, therefore, evil is not 
a substance. It literarily feeds on good that exists. Secondly, there are reasons to believe 
that good in the universe outweighs evil. And for this reason, the universe is still 
sustained. If evil is to be in greater proportion, then it is most likely that the universe 
would have ceased to exist or collapsed into chaos.   
Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil and the Probity of Doing Theodicy 
We have considered the logical problem of evidential evil according Rowe. One 
could ask, of what relevance is Rowe’s argument to the probity, morality, or rightness of 
doing theodicy? While theistic scholars may not agree that Rowe’s argument is enough to 
deny the existence of God, everyone would agree that his examples of specific evils (E1 
and E2), his logic, and sequential narrations, reveal or correspond with the reality of the 
intensity of pains and sufferings in our world. In this research work, we hold a theistic 
position that God exists, but we are not in any way denying the reality of pain and 
suffering, and for this reason, we are using, at least, the examples of evils in Rowe’s 
argument and the emphasis he added to the narrations to discuss the visceral quantum of 
experiencing pain and suffering.  
Everyone has unique epistemic right or intellectual apparatus to form justified 
beliefs or use whatever evidences they have to form their justified beliefs. In the light of 
this, theists believe in God while atheists do not believe in God either for lack of or for 
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insufficient evidence for the existence of God. Atheists also sometimes use the evidences 
of evil to support their denial of God’s existence.  
H.J. McCloskey, an atheistic scholar, in his article, “On Being an Atheist,” 
explains that atheism is not only true but that it provides more comfort than theism.100 In 
his response to the cosmological, teleological, and design argument for the existence of 
God, he argues that what theists claim to be an evidence to support the existence of God 
is so inadequate and groundless, that it probably leaves theists miserable.101 From his 
perspectives, the evidence from nature and the evidence from evil is enough to show that 
the universe does not have a designer contrary to what the traditional theistic argument 
holds. He writes on the existence of evil and the theistic claim of a creator that: 
The world we know does not reveal itself to us as the handiwork of an 
omnipotent, all-perfect being….. The world we know is a world containing great 
deal of evil, in particular, avoidable suffering endured by innocent human beings 
and animals. If we argue from the existence of this world to its creator, we must 
endow this creator with attributes which explain how he came to create such a 
world. We must conclude that he is either a malevolent powerful being or that he 
is a well-intentioned muddler, that the creator and the ruler of the universe is 
either not a God but an evil spirit or a well-intentioned finite being whose 
limitations result in very disastrous consequences. A belief in the existence of 
either is hardly a source of strength and security.102 
 
Although his argument was to prove that what theists hold to be a proof for the existence 
of God is not sufficient and can even be used against theism itself, his position is similar 
to that of any atheist that the existence of evil, pain, suffering, count against the belief in 
God. From his article referenced above, the avoidable suffering that innocent human 
                                                           
100 H.J. McCLoskey, “On Being an Atheist,” Question1, February 1968, 51-52. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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beings and animals endure make him even reduce God to a finite being. That is, perhaps, 
the extent at which he considers evil to impact how God could be conceived.  
 William Rowe who is also an atheist gave some specific examples of evils which 
we have considered earlier. These examples are the instances of intense suffering where a 
fawn was caught in the fire, lingered for several days, suffered and died, and also a 5 year 
old girl was raped tortured and strangled to death. The 5 year old girl been murdered in 
such a horrific way was a real life event which took place in Detroit Michigan and it 
demonstrates how true it is that terrible events happens in our world. Rowe explains that 
intense human and animal suffering could sometimes be justified but it remains an evil 
nevertheless.103 The visceral experience and intensity of suffering in our world is a real 
and persistent problem for humanity and theism in particular. 
 In Rowe’s earlier writings, the focus of his argument was that God could have 
created possible worlds where things could have been done differently; which could have 
made things different from what they are. These possible worlds will be such that there 
would be no Hitler or other intense, severe, protracted, voluntary and involuntary human 
pain which he considers to be purposeless or unnecessary in our world; at least in some 
instances. It is important to note at this juncture that there are lot of evils that occur in our 
world almost at every second. Some are actually very similar to the example of the fawn 
that was caught in the fire in a long distance while others are similar to the example of an 
innocent five year old girl that was raped and strangled to death. One could imagine 
millions of people on sickbeds suffering from cancer, stroke, different heart diseases, 
viral and bacterial infections etc. How about people that have suffered from human 
agents involving in sufferings like kidnap, rape, torture or even death and not to mention 
                                                           
103 Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 118. 
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various instances of natural evil that are regularly and consistently occurring. One could 
also imagine applying different theodicies to all these instances of sufferings and then 
wonder how morally right it is to actually justify that billions of people all over the world 
are having different types of pains and sufferings. Rowe is aware of the strategies of 
theodicists and that was the reason why he continued his 1979 argument by stating that: 
 “no good we know of justifies an omnipotent, a perfectly good being in permitting E1 
and E2. No good at all justifies a perfect being in permitting E1 and E2. Therefore, there 
is no perfect being.”104 As earlier stated, while we may not agree with him that God does 
not exist, we cannot deny the fact that there are instances of horrendous evil in our world. 
Rowe could possibly respond further that: even if there are instances of suffering 
that are necessary conditions for good, must they be in the quantity in which they are? 
For the amount of evils in the world, even if they are all justifiable, there is need to 
question their causes, sources, benefits, and good, if they exist. Secondly, if the good for 
which God could have allowed these evils is not seeable, it is reasonable to think that all 
the goods for which these intense sufferings occur cannot all have low seeability. There 
should be some occasions, at least, where the reasons will not all have low seeability. 
Thirdly, what could probably be the purpose or greater good for the fawn’s death? Even 
if we do not agree that it is purposeless, what could probably be the good for which the 
fawn had to suffer for seven days before dying? The fawn would have at least, died at the 
moment in which the fire began. Or better still, it could have died either the first day to 
reduce the suffering. Or either the second, third, fourth, fifth, or even sixth day. Why the 
prolonged suffering? And lastly, some theistic scholars believe that God would allow us 
                                                           
104 Rowe, The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look, 61. 
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to experience some evils which could serve as or represent an unglorified state, in order 
for us to appreciate the glorified state which will be free of evil. The unglorified state is 
the state when someone is experiencing suffering or any type of evil, while the glorified 
state is the state that can be described as the post-suffering state when someone has learnt 
from evil, or even any state when the particular evil that was experienced would have 
stopped. Perhaps, another way to understand the glorified state might not be limited to 
when evil stops, ceases to exist alone, it could also be the hope of the afterlife. One could 
ask, what glorified life, either when evil ceases to exist or afterlife, would compensate the 
pain in which the mother of the five year old girl? Apart from the possibility that the evil 
could serve as a warning for those that might want to commit similar evil, what greater 
good does the girl’s death brings to her or to her mother? After all, the innocent girl is 
dead and she could not have experienced any character development or any other post-
suffering benefit in this life.  
These responses and many other similar reasons would be why this research is 
important. The purpose of this work is to investigate the probity, morality, and rightness 
of doing theodicy. How relevant could theodicy be to the mother of the 5 year old girl? 
What is the rightness of justifying the reasons why God could have allowed the death of 
the innocent 5 year old girl? To several women that have been raped in this world today, 
how should we justify the reasons why such evils exists? What purpose does theodicy 
serve to the victims of various instances of intense suffering? According to Rowe, for the 
fact that one instance occurred, probably implies that there are many other instances that 
could have also occurred all over the world. From the questions we have asked above and 
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many others that we have not asked, it is obvious that there are lots of problems that 
emerge from doing theodicy. In the following chapter, we shall focus on these problems.  
Should Theism Respond to Evil with a Theodicy? 
No matter how passionate, emotional, or realistic we might be about horrendous 
evil, it is a simple fact that it will be difficult for theists not to do theodicy. If we decide 
not to do theodicy, what could be a better replacement for it? If theists decide not to 
respond to Rowe’s evidential argument from evil, what could be a better response? While 
there are problems associated with theodicy, we are not certain of what could probably be 
a better a response. It appears that theistic scholars are left with limited options once 
theodicy is out of the equation. 
The good thing about the enterprise of theodicy is that even theists acknowledge 
some of the problems that could probably emerge from it. It is this acknowledgement that 
probably makes theodicists even criticize each other’s work. In John Hick’s response to 
D.Z Philips’ book, The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, he (Hick) acknowledges 
the problem of doing theodicies and also expresses the importance of criticizing other 
theodicists. 
One of the good purposes of theodicy that Hick wrote about and in which Philips 
agrees with is his presupposition of the virtues that evil bring which are more valuable 
than virtues that are naturally created in people without effort. Hick writes, “one principle 
of my approach is ….the principle that virtues that have been formed within the agent as 
a hard-won deposit of right decisions in situations of challenge and temptation are 
intrinsically more valuable than ready-made virtues created within her without any effort 
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on her part.”105 Hick claims that Philips agree with him that “the idea of ready-made 
virtues is incoherent.”106 However, Philips’ critique of Hick’s theodicy and other 
theodicies is that, it “suppresses or ignores obvious examples of the disastrous effects 
suffering has had on human beings; the way in which it has marked them.”107 This 
criticism that Philips made of Hick’s theodicy, is similar to Rowe’s submission earlier 
stated that, intense human and animal suffering could sometimes be justified but it 
remains an evil nevertheless. In other words, theodicists might justify reasons why God 
could have allowed various evils but that does not remove the effect that these evils have 
on human beings. The concern of atheistic scholars like Rowe and Philips or other 
scholars that criticizes theodicy is that even if there are rational reasons or valid 
arguments to support theism, the intense and horrible effect of evils on human beings and 
animals cannot be denied. On the act of justifying reasons for the existence of evil, 
Philips wonders if anyone in their right mind would say the holocaust is justified.108 
  However, Hick disagrees with Philips that, theodicists ignore the effect of evils on 
human beings. In fairness to Hick, it is necessary to commend his criticism of theodicy in 
his book Evil and the God of Love.109 Hick spoke of effects of evil as “purely 
dysteleological and destructive.”110 He further writes on the effects of evil: 
                                                           
105 John Hick, “D.Z. Philips on God and Evil” Religious Studies 43, no.4 (December 2007): 433. 
106 Ibid. 
107 D. Z. Philips, The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God (London: SCM Press, 2004), 67.  
108 Philips, The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, 70. 
109 Reasons why we should not do Theodicy, see Marilyn McCord Adams, foreword to Evil and 
the God of Love, by John Hick, xvi-xviii. Although John Hick is a theistic scholar who has written in 
defense of theism on many topics and especially on the problem of evil, he also writes on some basic 
problems that could emerge from doing theodicy. The first problem with theodicy is that theism presents 
God as the perfect being who has a personal relationship with his creatures, (both humans and angels) and 
sin is as a result of breach in this relationship. Then the problem that emerges from doing theodicy is not 
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They can break their victim’s spirit and cause him to curse whatever gods there 
may be. When a child dies of cerebral meningitis, his little personality 
undeveloped and his life unfulfilled leaving only an unquenchable aching void in 
his parent’s lives: or when a charming, lively, and intelligent woman suffers from 
a shrinking of her brain which    destroys her personality and leaves her in an 
asylum, barely able to recognize her nearest relatives, until death comes in middle 
age as a baneful blessing; or when a child is born so deformed and defective that 
he can never live a proper human life, but must always be an object of pity to 
some and revulsion to others…. When such things happen we can see no gain to 
the soul, whether of the victim or others, but on the contrary only a ruthlessly 
destructive purpose which is inimical to human values…. Instead of ennobling, 
affliction may crush the character and rest from it whatever virtues it possessed.111   
 
From the passage quoted from Hick’s theodicy, it is obvious that Philips criticism of Hick 
and other theodicists might not be as he claims. Hick apparently did not ignore or 
suppress the effects of horrible and horrendous evil on human beings. Hick explains that 
Philips made a wrong assumption when he argues that the holocaust was justified. As far 
as Hick is concerned, the holocaust was not in God’s plan. It was human agents who 
exercised their free will to commit the monstrous evil. He writes on the holocaust: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
just because of the occurrences of evil but it is the problem that evil brings to the integrity of the personal 
relationship that God has with his creatures. Secondly, he writes on the general conception of a human 
being as a free agent and self-determined. He believes that the theologies that presents man as a perfect 
creation in a perfect environment is not correct. This is because at creation, if man was created perfect and 
was put in a perfect environment, there is likely hood that man will chose right even as a free agent. Such a 
condition will make it almost impossible to choose against God. He prefers to argue that man required 
ignorance at creation and as free agent, was free either to choose the awareness of God or not. Hick 
criticizes theodicies that intend to find the origin of evil from the fall of Adam; he considers it to be 
“philosophically unintelligible.” Thirdly, he choose to keep side with liberal theology. This type of 
theology is compatible with science and evolution against some other types of theologies such as 
Augustine’s theology that is incompatible with natural science. Hick admits that “if Augustinians posit a 
scientifically impossible beginning, his own soul making theodicy seems to require a scientifically 
incredible end. For human happily-ever-after intimacy with God is mostly, if not exclusively, post-mortem” 
(p. xvii). He had earlier appealed to compatibilism between religion and science where he argued that 
“evolution proves that evil-‘nature, red in tooth and claw- antedates the emergence of humankind and so 
cannot originate in human sin.”  Finally, Hick wrote on the “divine goodness and the morally outrageous,” 
where he demands to know “how God could love created persons and still locate them in an evil-strewn 
world such as this.” He argues that his “choice of love signals that he will not rest his theodicy on any 
claim that God has no obligations to treat creatures one way rather than another.” He rejects Augustinian-
doctrines of “hell and/or double predestination, which imply that God after all does hate something that 
God has made.”  
110 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 330-331. 
111 Ibid. 
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What does that ultimate purpose mean for Auschwitz and Belsen and the other 
camps in which between 1942 and 1945, between four and six million Jewish 
men, women and Children were deliberately and scientifically murdered? Was 
this in any sense willed by God? The answer is obviously no. These events were 
utterly evil, wicked, devilish and, so far as the human mind can reach, 
unforgivable; they are wrongs that can never be righted, horror which will 
disfigure the universe to the end of time, and in relation to which no 
condemnation can be strong enough, no revulsion adequate. It would have been 
better – much better – if they had never happened. Most certainly God did not 
want those who committed these fearful crimes against humanity to act as they 
did. His purpose for the world was retarded by them and the power of evil within 
it increased…112 
 
By way of concluding this chapter, it is obvious that Rowe’s observation of intense 
human and animal suffering is true but his submission that they are purposeless remains 
debatable. If these evils are not necessarily purposeless, then it means that the first 
premise of his argument is not true. Furthermore, contrary to Philips’ submission that 
theodicists make effort to justify evil hereby making them neglect the effect of evil on 
human beings may not be necessarily true. It is not necessarily a true submission because 
the act of attempting to provide answers to people’s problem, which is what theodicy 
stands for, may not necessarily be an attempt to ignore the effects of these evils.  The 
only condition in which theistic scholars and theodicists could have neglected human 
beings and animal suffering is if they had denied the occurrences of these evils.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  Is Theism Justified in Doing Theodicy? 
Theodicy is a theistic enterprise which attempts to infer reasonable framework or 
narration to the purpose for which God might have permitted evil. Although it is most 
often misrepresented with defense, it differs from defense in its framework or narration. 
Defense looks for a logical reason to serve as a response to the problem of evil. Before 
responding to the question of whether it is moral to do theodicy or not, it is necessary to 
address the significance of theodicy in our modern world.  
The problem of evil is mainly a logical problem that atheistic philosophers use to 
question the existence of God. Like Rowe’s evidential argument from evil, it is mainly a 
logical problem that represents instances of real life situations. From the distinction made 
between theodicy and defense, a defense seems appropriate to respond to the logical 
problems of evil since both share some essential properties of logic. However, theistic 
philosophers have sometimes used theodicy and defense interchangeably. For the purpose 
of this chapter, defense and theodicy will be used interchangeably as a theistic response 
to the problem of evil. 
Importance of Theodicy in a Contemporary World 
 
Since 9/11 attack, there has been need to put more attention into the theorization 
of theodicy. A day after this attack, R. Albert Mohler Jr, President of Southern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, presents a puzzle about the narration of theodicy and the 
experiential reaction to the reality of evil. In his address to the SBTS alumni, he writes: 
We dare not speak on God’s behalf to explain why he allowed these particular 
acts of evil to happen at this time to these persons and in this manner. Yet, at the 
same time, we dare not be silent when we should testify to the God of 
righteousness and love and justice who rules over all in omnipotence. Humility 
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requires that we affirm all that the Bible teaches, and go on further. There is much 
we do not understand. As Charles Spurgeon explained, when we cannot trace 
God’s hand, we must simply trust his heart.113 
 
Like many other tragedies or evils in the last two centuries, 9/11 raises the question of 
why a good God should have allowed that type of evil to happen to those people, and in 
that manner. Most of the theodicies that have been considered earlier in this work such 
as: free will, soul making, greater good, degree of happiness, theistic skepticism etc. will 
provide some form of answers to the Mohler’s puzzle. But the question of the morality of 
doing theodicy itself remains unanswered.  
 Although the problem of evil remains, we cannot undermine the solutions that 
various theodicies have brought to our world. The simple truth to accept is that, no 
defense or theodicy can permanently answer the problem of evil. As many theistic 
scholars still agree, the problem of evil is a persistent problem for theism. Despite these 
problems, theism and theodicy are the available solutions to the problem of evil. 
Philosophers who argue against theism do not seem to explain the mystery, they only 
analyze the problem or create the awareness that the problem of evil exists. Theistic 
scholars on the other hand, make efforts to provide probable answers, solutions or 
probable explanations to the problem.  
Theodicy provides more than logical propositions or explanations, it also gives 
hope to the sufferer, and care to those in need of epistemic or intellectual response to the 
problem of evil. Other effort from theism and theistic scholars includes: searching for 
moral grounds for doing theodicy, introducing the concept of God’s love, as well as 
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focusing more on sufferers. Plantinga calls this aspect of theodicy pastoral care. With 
pastoral care, attention should shift from providing reasons, to offering narrations or 
frameworks that can heal the wounds of sufferers that either believe in God or not.  
Problems Associated with Theodicies 
Theodicy remains a problem as much as it could be a solution. Some philosophers 
argue that theodicy tends to bring more problems to the problem of evil than solution. 
Marilyn M. Adams and D.Z Philips seem to agree on the idea that theodicy is a failure.114 
Gleeson Andrew writes that, “Marilyn McCord Adams agrees with D.Z Philips that 
instrumental theodicies is a moral failure, and that skeptical theists and others are guilty 
of ignoring what we know now (in this life) about the moral reality of horrendous evils to 
speculate about unknown ways these evils might be made sense of.”115 
Adams rejects some instrumental theodicies. These theodicies are considered failed 
because they only serve the purpose of treating evil as “a logically unavoidable 
conditions of greater good.” 116 Adams also argue that some instrumental theodicies only 
aim to justify God’s act of creating a world that is littered with horrendous evils. In his 
philosophy, God prefers to allow horrors of evil as a required price for good, although he 
also agrees with Nelson Pike on the morality of God’s actions. Adams concludes that 
horrendous evil that humans suffer is for a greater good, and that this experience will 
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bring about an eternal intimacy with God.117 This good will even make sufferers 
appreciate their suffering. Gleeson rejects Adams conclusion. He believes that his 
conclusion is disconnected from his argument for the failure of theodicy.118 
There are instances where theodicy is only for scholarly purpose and it falls short 
of meeting the need of a sufferer. For instance, of what good is theodicy to a woman who 
has lost her only child or to a father whose teenage girl was raped in a Christian camp? 
These examples of evils do not only bring an unquantifiable pain to the heart of those 
involved but even betrays the very standard that religion seems to uphold.  
Possible concerns that theodicy raises are: 
1. Theodicy seems to ignore the pain and suffering of the sufferer in cases where 
evil is justified as a necessary condition for good. 
2. Theodicy is distanced from sufferer’s real experience. 
3. Theodicy raises moral questions based on the visceral experience of pain and 
suffering.  
4. It is sometimes relevant as an academic enterprise and lacks any real life solution. 
5. It does not seem to advance the purpose of theism. 
6. Theodicists are merely responding to an obligation to defend their faith. 
7. It sometimes presents evil as good: an example of this problem is an instance 
where theodicists intend to give reasons why evil could serve a good purpose.  
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Theodicy is part of most world religions. This is because most religions look up to 
a saving God, personal or impersonal, who could give hope of a better life and who is 
also powerful enough to prevent suffering. It becomes a problem when a situation arises 
where the existence of evil or suffering becomes irreconcilable with the character of God 
whom they worship. But to really do justice to the evaluation of theodicy, some 
clarifications needed to be made. Firstly, it is the responsibility of every living religion to 
give explanation to why the world is the way it is. This is important because every 
religion appears to be sufficient enough to give an account of the past (beginning of life), 
present (why the world is the way it is), and the future (how the world will continue to 
be). Failure to cover these periods or areas of human curiosity, might undermine the 
plausibility of that religion, especially to its adherents or followers. 
Secondly, thoughts of theodicy have to be differentiated from the act.119 Thoughts 
of theodicy “consist of fixed arguments and knowledge claims that are often abstracted 
from personal experience- from the act of theodicy.”120 The act of theodicy is “the 
dynamic, deliberate, and conscious cognitive actions individuals undertake to reconcile 
their religious beliefs with experience of suffering.”121 From the distinctions made, the 
‘thought’ evolves from the ‘act.’ The thought seems to be an outcome of the act and it 
(thought) provides a theoretical understanding of how an individual can accomplish the 
act of theodicy, and why theodicy is the way it is. 
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Theodicy as a Face-work: A Scientific/Psychological Approach to Theodicy 
Using Goffman’s “face and face-work” Shane Sharp argues that theodicy has an 
imaginary dimension for the purpose of performing face-work which he believes is for 
the purpose of saving other people or imagined person’s actions and performance.122 
Applying this to theodicy, he explains the reasons why believers who are victims of 
various evil, seem to develop a face-work for God. From an analysis and interview with 
victims of various evils, he concludes that their idea of God combines with a sense of 
responsibility to defend their faith. With the general idea of God, notion of free will and 
sin, and the knowledge of Satan, believers tend to present God as a morally perfect being, 
usually exempting God from the cause of any evil, hereby making God innocent of their 
sufferings.123 This face saving account provides a cognition that helps reconfirm 
believers’ consistency and relief from cognitive imbalance incited by their pains and 
sufferings. Sharp interviewed Christians who were victims of various forms of evil and 
he concluded that these believers’ fall in either of the three categories:  “fidelity to a 
higher principle, ultimate benefit, and shifting blame.”124 When believers suffer, they 
bear the burden to defend God hereby making them look for other places or reasons why 
the evil could have befallen them. They believe that God is morally perfect and good, and 
cannot be the cause of their problems. They also believe that since God has allowed the 
evil to happen to them, there would be an ultimate benefit that will accompany their 
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suffering. Lastly, some believers prefer to blame themselves or perpetrators of these evils 
as the cause of their sufferings. 
What does Theodicy Intend to Accomplish? 
Since theodicy is a probable reason why God could have allowed evil, theodicy could be 
useful to respond to the problem of evil either in its logical or evidential form: 
a. A theodicist should begin by defining the character of God to remove any form of 
ambiguity. This includes the need to clarify the fact that God being omnipotent 
and omniscient does not imply that God can do anything whatsoever even if it 
contradicts his nature, but that he can  do that which is not contradictory to logical 
possibility. God will not do something that is logically contradictory to his 
character. 
b. God has to create a world with moral evil where morally free agents can also 
express their freedom. God would not have created a world with free agents 
without moral evil. 
c. If he removes evil, there would not be an actual world where human beings will 
be functional. One case logically makes it impossible for the other case to be 
possible. 
d. The concept of morality makes it possible to discuss the deontological frame-
work of ethics in relation to human free will. The principle of morality makes it 
such that one cannot be held responsible either for what he did not do or from 
what the antecedent condition could not have allowed him to refrain from doing. 
God has made it possible for human beings to make choices, perform an action or 
do otherwise; hereby making them morally accountable for their actions. 
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e. If God has created free agents, one might want to ask if God is free. God is not 
bounded by any laws or antecedent conditions, but he cannot create a world where 
there will be free agent without moral evil.  
Evils from Theodicy 
D. Z. Philips is a major anti-theodical scholar who sees theodicy as worse than the 
known evils. He believes that theodicy betray those who suffer from evil. He argues that 
theodicy does not make any moral sense. This is because there is no justification of any 
form for God to allow his creatures to suffer in order to achieve any purpose. Philips’s 
position is that theodicy is an instrument of oppression that deliberately suppresses and 
ignores the disastrous impact or effects of suffering on human beings.125 He believes that 
God lacks any form of moral perfection or goodness. This is because the theodicist 
explains that God had to inflict, allow, or permit evil in order for him to bring about some 
good which in turn redeems the evil. If God shares the same moral community with 
humans,126 then there is no justification for him to allow disastrous effects of suffering on 
his creatures.  
Philips argues that those that would have allowed events that brings pain and 
suffering are callous and insensitive to the human suffering. He also explains that evil 
seems to be “an unavoidable consequences of God’s purposes.” And that without evil, 
God cannot simply achieve good. He posits that this is a major problem for theism 
because theodicists use the platform of theodicy to present evil as good or to make evil 
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look like good. For him, justifying evil is another type of evil. The work of theodicists 
where by evil is been described as a necessary condition for good had made evil look 
morally familiar with us. Terrence Tilley also writes that “I have come to see theodicy as 
a discourse practice which disguises real evils while those evils continue to afflict people. 
In short, engaging in the discourse practice of theodicy creates evils.”127    
Philips is especially critical of John Hick’s “Soul Making Theodicy,” saying that 
Hick’s theodicy is self-defeating and lacks character. He writes: 
We are told that in allowing evils to exist, God is providing the conditions needed 
to give us the choice of moulding our characters in one direction or another. This 
offer of God’s morally sufficient reason suffers from a fatal objection. To make 
the development of one’s character an aim to ensure that the development will not 
take place. This is because the endeavor so conceived is self-defeating: it lacks 
character.128 
 
Hasker objects to Philips’ criticism and submits that his (Philips’) argument fails 
out rightly, and that the God he refers to is not the same as the Christian God. To begin 
with, Hasker explains that God cannot be “subjectable to our moral judgement.”129  He 
also objects to the notion that God is a member of our moral community. This is because 
if God is considered to be a member of our moral community, then he would be like any 
other moral agent that can be subjected to moral evaluations. Hasker explains that God 
does not have moral limitations, is not limited in knowledge like humans, and his wisdom 
is infinite, it follows that it does not make sense for a human mind to want to judge him. 
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The human mind cannot possibly understand his ideas. Like Pike, Hasker also argues that 
God has morally sufficient reasons for his actions.  
Morality of Theodicies 
Soul Making Theodicy 
In his soul making theodicy, Hick explains that man is created in such a way that 
his moral character will be developed through experience. Man is created in God’s image 
but for him to reflect God’s likeness, he has to develop, which can only come from 
experiences. This experience however, can only be derived from the existence of evils in 
the world, hereby making evil a necessary condition for soul making. 
The soul making theodicy is for the development of God’s children. According to 
John Hick, God has created us in his image. But the sufferings, evils and harsh nature of 
the world is meant to give us an experience for character development in such a way that 
will take us to the position of God’s likeness. Hick agrees that the major problem to the 
theodicy consists in “the fact that instead of serving a constructive purpose, pain and 
misery seem to be distributed in random and meaningless ways, with the result that 
suffering is often underserved and often falls upon men in amounts exceeding anything 
that could be rationally intended”130 
Life beyond the grave seems to be an integral part of Christian theodicy. If there 
is any resolution to the interplay between good and evil or the reason why God permits 
evil, it has to be beyond this world. God has a purpose for good and evil and this purpose 
is beyond the grave. If the Christian theodicy is mostly for life beyond the grave then the 
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purpose of evil in this world is for life beyond grave. Therefore, the purpose of evil in 
this world is life beyond grave. 
The main problem in the argument is that the soul making theodicy seems to be 
an explanation or solution to the problem of suffering in this world but this solution is 
reserved for afterlife alone. The argument itself does not guarantee afterlife and if it does 
not, there is possibility that some people’s suffering will be in vain. This is because the 
requirement to be in God’s likeness is not to suffer alone. Also, there are instances of 
intense suffering that might even not fit into Hick’s description of soul-making. Evil is 
unevenly and randomly distributed in the universe. What make some people deserve 
some types of suffering than others (kidnap, rape, holocaust, war, famine, etc.)? How will 
suffering be quantified? Theodicy is meant to be an explanatory solution to the problem 
of evil but the problem that arises from theodicy necessitate the need to make an inquiry 
into the morality of the art of doing theodicy. 
Skeptical Theism 
Skeptical Theism as a type of theodicy, comprise of two components: skepticism 
and theism.131 The main idea of skepticism is to mainly explain the possibility that we 
cannot think that we are aware of all the possible goods and evils that exist.132 Similarly, 
we should not think that there exists an entailment relationship between the possible 
goods that there are, and the permission or prevention are representatives of the possible 
evils and goods that there are.133 The theism component holds to the traditional 
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understanding of theism that portrays God’s power, wisdom and love. The skeptical 
component provides the theistic component with the philosophical tools of skepticism in 
such a way that the skeptical theist can still maneuver the concept of theodicy with 
skepticism. 
The idea of skeptical theism provides a platform that could probably make 
theodicy less worthy of serving its purpose.134 For instance, let’s assume that a skeptical 
theist argues that there are no reasons to think that  the possible goods that there are, 
might not be the only goods for which God could have permitted E1 and E2, however, we 
should not also think that God is justified in permitting E1 and E2. The same reasoning 
that produce the thought that there are probably more goods than we think there are, 
could be the same reasoning for which God is not justified for permitting E1 and E2. As 
much as this could be a probable response to the problem of evil, it does not seem to 
correspond or track with the reality of what theodicy stands for. 
Skepticism is known for providing a result whose domain makes its induction less 
probable than what could have been justifiable a priori, given the possibility of our 
intuitive introspection. It could also imply that what skepticism could probably justify is a 
subset of what is considered to be impossible hereby making it inconsistent with what 
theodicy stands for. Theodicy’s main goal is not to provide more platforms or state of 
affairs for doubt or the unknown, but rather to provide answers to some problems that 
have to do with the reasons why God could permit evil. 
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Is God Morally Guilty for Permitting Evil? 
In Atle Sovik’s response to critics of theodicies, he begins by stating that moral 
judgement is dependent on what is true.135 He argues that if theodicies’ main purpose is 
to search out for what is true, then “a moral dismissal of all theodicies for moral reasons 
is even less substantiated since it fails to recognize the difference between searching for 
the truth and communicating the truth. In his argument, he believes that searching for the 
truth about God is not immoral.”136 If theodicy is all about searching for truth, then it is a 
moral enterprise. 
 Most critics of theodicy take for granted that God exists and yet argue against that 
submission. But If God exits, then some conditions should follow. For instance, if God 
exists then he is the being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and he is also an 
infinite God. If he has all those characters, then he cannot be judged. He is infinite and 
we cannot understand his ways with a finite mind.  
Secondly, God could do either of two things. He could have either created moral 
agents that have free will and hereby permitting evil, or not permit evil by not creating 
morally free agent. Feinberg argues that God cannot remove evil without removing some 
other positive goods along with it. For God to accomplish some good, the existence of 
evil in the world is inevitable. On this ground, God cannot be said to be guilty of 
permitting evil in this world. He permits evil in order to achieve some more morally good 
purposes. Feinberg writes:137 
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….. God isn’t free both to remove evil and to accomplish the other positive goal 
in our world. Hence, he isn’t guilty for failing to do both. For example, God can 
either remove evil or give us free will. If he removes evil, he isn’t guilty for 
failing to give us free will. If he gives us free will, he isn’t guilty for failing to 
remove evil. He can’t do both conjointly, so he isn’t guilty for failing to do 
both.138 
 
A state of affairs where God will remove evil and give free might lead to a contradiction. 
Although he is omnipotent, he will not do things that are contradictory. It could be 
reasonable to conclude then that God is morally justified for permitting evil in our world.  
 From the point of investigating the probity of theodicy, the role of God comes 
first. From Feinberg’s argument, God is morally not guilty for permitting evil. 
Considering Rowe’s evidential argument from evil, God could not have brought about a 
contradictory state of affairs in order to prevent instances of intense suffering. It is one 
thing for an instance of evil to be pointless, and it is another for God to have allowed it. 
The idea of pointless could mean that the event is without purpose, which is probably not 
the case. That we do not know the purpose does not mean that it is purposeless. We 
probably do not know this purpose. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
something or an event is pointless if that particular thing or event has “no meaning, 
purpose, or effect.”139 From this definition of what pointless is, there is no such thing as 
pointless when it comes to evil. The instance of evil (E1 and E2) that Rowe inferred in 
his argument, counters what the word pointless means. E1 and E2, have meaning, have 
purpose, although we might not be aware of their purposes, and it also has effect and this 
effect could be the outcome of the evil. This could imply that Rowe was begging the 
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question by definition from his argument against theism on his evidential argument. He 
could have also committed the fallacy of sweeping generalization by making an inference 
from an instance of evil to a general application. His argument consists of some form of 
ambiguity when he moves from one instance of what he perceived to be an intense 
suffering to a general application where he concludes that God does not exist, based on 
one instance of occurrence of evil.  
 While some might agree that God is not guilty for permitting evil, another aspect 
of the argument is: why did God make the option to give free will and not the option to 
remove evil? How would a world without evil look like? If God had removed evil and 
free will, there is a high probability that the same question will still be asked that, why 
did God remove free will? A theistic response could be that it would have been a good 
world without evil but it is probably a better world with free will. The good present 
seems to overbalance or counterbalance the evidential evil that Rowe propounded and all 
other forms of evil that there are. Therefore, God’s judgement of permitting evil probably 
brought about a better world and this option is a morally perfect option. Hence, it is moral 
to do theodicy. Nelson Pike posits that God has a “morally sufficient reason for his 
actions.”140 
Evaluating the Morality of the Theodicist 
If God is morally perfect and is justified in permitting evil, how could we evaluate 
the theodicist who defends God? Since we have justified God’s decision to allow evil as a 
morally perfect decision, it is the religious and intellectual responsibility of a theodicist to 
make a defense for God, by arguing that despite the existence of all forms of evil, God is 
                                                           
140 Nelson Pike, “Hume and Evil” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Adams, M. M. and Adams, R. M., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 41. 
 77 
 
omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, perfect, and loving. God cannot remove evil and 
still achieve this actual world. He had probably provided the best possible actual world. 
He cannot remove evil and not remove free evil at the same time and in the same way. 
Since he cannot do both, he is not morally guilty nor does he cease to be God for not 
bringing about a contradictory state of affairs. Summarily, the theodicist only uses 
theodicy as an instrument to justify the act of God. 
Victims of Evil and Theodicy 
It is very difficult for a sufferer to grasp the importance of encouragement, 
consolation, or theodical explanations as to why God could have permitted the evil that 
might have occurred. This could be that the sufferer is hurt, shocked, disappointed, or 
discouraged. At this point, the whole message of theodicy is of little or no relevance to a 
sufferer. It is to this end that we argue that theodicy should be able to offer more than 
rational arguments for the acts of God. When tragedy or evil occurs, most of the time, the 
people involved are not interested in knowing that God could have allowed the evil for 
him to achieve a greater good. It usually requires some time of reflection and 
encouragement for a sufferer to be ready to know the cause of such tragedy or other 
probable causes. 
Although God might have performed his responsibility to ensure that he creates 
an actual world where there are moral agents, the effect of occurrences of evil make some 
people to question the goodness of God. Some victims of evil live with pain and 
suffering, while some even die horrible deaths.  
At this juncture, we might have to put all the theodicies together in order to 
formulate a reasonable response. The hope of afterlife from Hick’s Soul Making 
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Theodicy, could be one of the answers. If there is an afterlife, then God would probably 
meet the needs of victims of different evil. Adams argues that theodicy is used as an 
instrument to serve as logical compensation in order to vindicate God and present him as 
morally perfect.141 In her final analysis, she explains that the assurance of the eternal 
intimacy with God in the afterlife serve as defeaters to the various evils that exist, hereby 
preserving the conception of God’s goodness and love. 
Secondly, since the misuse of free will can account for some instances of evil, 
moral agents are to be blamed for such evils. Perhaps, if some victims of intense 
suffering are given the options of reviewing God’s decision to grant free will or remove 
evil, they could have probably preferred to be agents that can make free choices, rather 
than not experience evil but also not have freedom to choose. The good of freedom seems 
to override the problem of evil. Perhaps this could be one of the reasons why Adams 
argues that, there will be a time when the victims of evil would stop wishing that they had 
never suffered. 
Thirdly, it is possible that the maxims of morality could be traced to the existence 
of some instances of evil. Hasker argues that God could undermine morality if he 
completely prevents evil. To what extent this argument is valid cannot be verified. But 
there are instances where some occurrences of evil have served some positive goods for 
those that were spectators or witnesses of such evils. Spectators or witnesses of such evil 
cannot be limited to those that were present at such events. With writing, modernization, 
civilization, information technology, and the internet, the scope of spectators have greatly 
expanded. The world is now a global village and information is being reported and 
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preserved in different micro-components of technological appliances. Information can go 
around the world in less than one minute. So, God could allow the occurrence of an evil 
to serve a purpose of cautioning, and character development for others. Even instances of 
evil that have been recorded thousands of years ago are still being preserved today, and 
billions of people learn from it. While this argument might not serve any good for some 
victims, Hasker may be correct is arguing that morality is being preserved. 
Finally, the universe has sustained itself even with the amount and types of evil 
that exists. The amount of evil that exists could have necessitated the problem of evil, but 
the universe has not collapsed into chaos or ceased to exist. Scientists explain that there is 
a minimum amount of pain the body needs for the human nervous system to be active. 
Some people even suffer from their inability to experience a minimum amount of pain. 
According to Hasker, evil remains a necessary factor for the universe to continue to exist. 
Christian Reflection: What could be the Moral Basis for Theodicy? 
Let’s assume that God permitting the crucifixion of Jesus is such a unique trauma 
and evil, which comprise of an example of horrendous pain and suffering. Why should 
God have permitted or even ordained such evil? Could it be that the outcome of this evil 
was meant to bring a greater good? Is God justified in permitting this evil? Whatever the 
answers to these questions, it was a type of evil that Christian theism justifies its purpose. 
This purpose is conceived to be of a greater good. From the perspective of Christian 
theism, this was a great evil from which the entire humanity was going to be saved. It 
brought about salvation and regeneration. From this illustration, we can build an 
argument for the morality of theodicy, since God is morally perfect and his reasons for 
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permitting evil should be considered morally perfect, even if we do not have a clear 
understanding of it. 
The probable moral base upon which theodicy can be built is the goodness and 
love of God. Although there is evil in this world, God did not create evil. Evil is simply 
the absence of good or the privation of good. Therefore, it is not appropriate to think of 
God as the author of evil, pain, and suffering. At the same time, God is never 
overwhelmed by the damage done by evil. He can also turn it around and use it for the 
advantages of his creatures. Suffering can as well be an opportunity for God to work, as 
he uses these evils to bring about greater goods. 
It is also important to point out that there is no pointless or gratuitous evil in the 
Christian theodicy. Everything has purpose and could be for a better outcome. Using an 
instance of Rowe’s example of a fawn that suffered and died, it appears pointless in an 
atheistic argument but a theistic scholar believes that God could have allowed it for a 
greater good that we are probably unaware of. Evil as an outcome of a cause could not 
have happened without a sufficient reason why it should occur. One could ask for what 
probable good the fawn could have suffered and died? It is not going to be accurate to 
give a specific reason, but it is not unreasonable to say that it could have been for a 
greater good in the animal kingdom. Perhaps, its death is necessary for other animals to 
survive. Perhaps, the fawn was going to cause a bad or worse evil to other lower animals. 
The point to be made here is that, no event is pointless.  
Rowe could argue that the death of Sue (E2) was undoubtedly pointless, since it is 
of no good for her or her mother, or other members of her family. Of what good could the 
death of an innocent girl possibly be? There is no doubt that the death of Sue caused a lot 
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of pain, and even cause some people to doubt the existence of the omnipotent God. But 
no one can claim to come close to the wisdom of God. If God exists, then it is possible 
that he has all the qualities ascribed to him: goodness, love, wisdom, patience, power etc. 
Since God exists and he allowed it, then it is for a greater good that we may not know of. 
Probably it is not for the perpetrator or the victim herself, it could be for someone or a 
group of persons other than those involved.  
For what reason or good could God have permitted the biblical suffering of Job? 
Those that lived during the time of Jesus, probably do not have access to the prophecy 
that Jesus was going to be crucified. They could have imagined why such a unique 
trauma and a terrible suffering could have happened to those peaceful and blameless 
people, like Job and Jesus. Perhaps if Rowe had lived in the time of Jesus, he could have 
also called it a pointless suffering. But it turns out not to be pointless in the real sense of 
it. Probably, Christians today believed that Jesus suffered such an underserved death for 
billions of people to be saved from sin. Christianity could make the claim today, simply 
because of the bigger picture we could see, that was probably not available to those that 
lived before us. Perhaps if we could see the greater picture of the entire narration of 
human suffering and instances of evil, we could conclude that the bigger picture could 
provide better answers for us. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Summary 
The probity of theodicy is simply an investigation into the morality of doing theodicy. 
This research work is not to reject or criticize any particular theodicy but to investigate 
the morality of the act. We have discovered that theodicy is both a religious duty and a 
moral responsibility that can be used to unveil the mystery of evil and the existence of 
God. It presents a rational and logical reasons why God could have permitted evil. God 
permitting evil is not just a moral act but it also a necessary good. It is a moral act for 
God to create moral agents that could make free choices. It is also a better decision for 
human beings to be morally responsible for their actions.  
Plantinga’s free will defense presents a defence against the logical problem of evil 
which holds that the co-existence of evil and God is not contradictory. Plantinga appeals 
to the definition of omnipotent which explains that God being omnipotent does not imply 
that God can do anything, but that he can do things that are not contradictory to his 
nature. In the light of this, he explains that God cannot both create morally free agents 
and also remove evil. Moral evil is as a result of the misuse of free will. From the 
perspective of morality, God is a morally perfect God and his option to create human 
beings as free agent is a morally perfect decision. The free will defense is considered to 
be a successful argument.  
Another type of evil is natural evil. This type of evil does not necessary involve the 
activity of moral agents. Critics of theism believe that even if free will defense is 
successful against logical problem evil, it seems to be inadequate for natural evil. Natural 
evils are natural disasters and the moral agents cannot be held responsible for its 
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occurrence, although some theistic scholars argue otherwise. This type of evil poses 
threat to theistic belief. But we briefly responded in this research that natural evils are 
effects of natural laws. They exist because of the natural laws that sustain the universe. 
Natural evils will cease to exist only if natural laws cease. But natural laws cannot cease 
because those laws are the reasons why the universe or nature exists. The laws of gravity, 
motion, heat, gaseous laws, kinetic laws, magnetic laws, etc. are the reasons why the 
earth rotates, we have rainfall, the wind can blows, there is change and time etc. All these 
laws serve good purposes but they are also responsible for earthquakes, flood, hurricanes, 
tornadoes, etc. Although these evils occur, it is probable that the good that the laws of 
nature brings supersedes the effects of natural evils.     
Rowe argued against the likelihood of theism using an argument from the evidence 
evil. In his evidential argument, he uses an instance of moral evil and another instance of 
natural evil. His inductive argument was meant to demonstrate that the probability that 
God exists is very low, hereby making theism most unlikely. His intension was to use 
some instances of suffering to make a general case against theism, given the types, 
amount, particulars, and distribution of evil in the world. He argues that there are no good 
reasons why God could have permitted evil.   The first instance was a case of a fawn that 
was caught up in fire and suffered for some days before it later died. While the second 
case was that of a 5 year old girl that was raped and strangled to death. Rowe’s argument 
is that these are instances of intense suffering and that there are no good reasons we know 
for which an omnipotence and omniscience God could have allowed them to have 
happened. Rowe concludes that there is high level of probability that God does not exist. 
Theistic scholars respond to Rowe’s argument in several ways. These responses are either 
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theodicies or defense. But a common response is that there are probably God-good 
purposes for which he could have allowed those intense suffering and that we probably 
could not comprehend or know these good reasons. That we could not see these good 
does not mean that they do not exist, perhaps, they have low seeability. If God prevents 
some evils, and allows some, how will he draw the line between evils to prevent and 
those to allow? God’s purpose for allowing evils are for good purposes, although these 
purposes could be beyond our ken, they serve good reasons. 
Theodicy helps to explain the reason why evil is in the world in relation to our 
understanding of God and His character as an all-powerful and wholly good God. The 
whole problem of evil is an attempt to ask the questions of why evil exists in the world 
and how it relates to human and animal suffering.  
Theism teaches that God is a personal God, at least in monotheistic religions. This 
implies that God is both transcendental and immanent. He relates with his creatures and 
also interacts with the world in such a way that he intervenes in their affairs or at least, 
had intervened at some point. Therefore, God is justified for whatever happens in the 
world for many reasons: 
a. The human mind is limited or finite and cannot claim to know all the reasons for 
which God might have permitted some or all cases of intense suffering. 
b. The goods for which God permitted some sufferings may not correspond or 
resonate with human conception or understanding of good. 
c. Purposes for which God might have permitted evil may be far beyond the ken of 
human beings’ knowledge. 
d. God’s judgement is perfect. 
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From this conception of God’s perfection, it is not reasonable to want to judge God or 
question his judgment since human knowledge is limited. However, there are still a lot of 
unanswered questions, especially in regards to why there is so much suffering. Since we 
do not know enough to judge the reason why there is so much suffering, why do theistic 
scholars think they know enough to do theodicy? 
Some critics of theodicy believe that theodicy is a failed enterprise. Their main 
argument is that given the character of God from theistic perspectives, there could not be 
any justifiable reason for defending God. They believe that the orthodox understanding of 
the character of God betrays the enterprise of theodicy. 
Conclusion 
Philosophers who criticize theodicy believe that God could have created a better 
world, either with minimum amount of evil or even without evil at all. But our overall 
evaluation shows that there cannot be a better option than for God to create this world 
where free agents can indeed act freely, even if it can also make them commit moral evil. 
However, it would not have been a better option for God not to create this actual world 
with its natural laws, and in which free agents are free to make free choices. By so doing, 
God acted morally and provided the best possible world for his creatures. It is also a 
moral responsibility for theodicists to provide probable reason for which God could have 
allowed evil. Theodicists who construct theodicy should endeavor make their 
explanations with love, compassion, empathy, and humility. By so doing, theodicy will 
not appear to be at a distance from the visceral experience of the sufferer, and it will not 
also appear to ignore the effect of evil on the sufferers. 
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